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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1980s, Mr. Harry Darks and his partner Mr. Andre 
Milton applied for a license to operate a dance hall in Cincinnati.1  The 
hall, called London Hall, was to operate as a disco club on weekend 
nights between 11:00 P.M. and 5:00 A.M.2  Liquor licenses were not 
available and Darks and Milton purposely chose those hours to avoid 
competition with other halls and clubs that did serve liquor.3  To Mr. 
Darks’s surprise, the City of Cincinnati summarily denied him the 
license to operate the hall.4  The reason underlying the denial was that 
Mr. Darks had been previously convicted of two felonies to which he 
pleaded guilty.5  Mr. Darks sued the City of Cincinnati claiming “that the 
City’s licensing policy deprived [him] of equal protection and due 
process of law.”6  The district court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the city.7 
                                                          
*   Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.  I 
would like to extend gratitude and special thanks to the University of Wisconsin Law School and 
those who participated in the Hastie Fellowship Reunion (2010) including Professor Peter 
Carstensen.  Many thanks also to the SW/SE/MW 2010 People of Color Conference with special 
thanks to Charlton Copeland and Osamudia James.  Also, I owe significant thanks to the faculty at 
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law including Professor Carlton Waterhouse, 
Professor George Wright, Professor Margaret Tarkington, and Professor Nicolas Terry.  And, of 
course, thank you to my mentor Kaaryn Gustafson for all of your support and helpful comments.   
 1.  Darks v. City of Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040, 1041 n.1 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Id.  
 4.  Id. at 1041. 
 5.  Id. at 1042; see Indictment and Plea, Ohio v. Darks, No. 85959 (Ohio Sup. Ct., Hamilton 
Cnty. 1965) (on file with author).  Research for this Article discovered only one state felony 
conviction.  Darks pleaded guilty to one felony count of receiving and concealing stolen goods, 
namely a stereo “Hi-Fi” Radio worth $375 in Hamilton County, Ohio in 1965.  
 6.  Darks, 745 F.2d at 1041. 
 7.  Id.  
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Appealing the district court’s judgment, Darks continued to allege 
equal protection and due process violations.8  On the equal protection 
claim, Darks specifically argued that Cincinnati’s “practice of denying 
dance hall licenses to all convicted felons deprived him of equal 
protection of the laws.”9  The municipal code of Cincinnati “provide[d] 
that licenses shall be issued only to ‘reputable person[s] of good moral 
character.’”10  On the due process claim, Darks asserted “that he was 
deprived of a liberty interest without due process of law because 
[Cincinnati’s] practice of denying licenses to felons on the grounds that 
they are not persons of good character amounts to an irrebuttable 
presumption.”11 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided that Cincinnati’s 
policy of wholesale denial of licenses to convicted felons was 
constitutionally permissible.12  Quoting the District Court, the Sixth 
Circuit agreed that, 
[T]he denial of dance hall licenses to convicted felons is rationally 
related to the legitimate state interest of insuring that such halls are 
operated by persons of integrity with a respect for the law, and insuring 
that they do not attract a criminal or other disreputable clientele.  It is 
rational to connect a past felony conviction with a disrespect for the 
law and a lack of moral integrity.  It is also rational to conclude that 
patrons exhibiting these traits would be more welcome at dance halls 
operated by those of like disposition than at dance halls operated by 
those without a past criminal record.13 
The Sixth Circuit made no distinction between crimes of moral turpitude 
and other crimes.14  Instead, it affirmed the lower court’s judgment that 
wholesale discrimination against individuals with felony convictions was 
constitutionally permissible under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.15  With regard to Darks’s due process 
allegations, the court dismissed the argument.  For the court, Cincinnati’s 
licensing policy was a “substantive law” that passes rational basis 
                                                          
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id. at 1042. 
 10.  Id. (second alteration in original). 
 11.  Id. at 1044. 
 12.  Id. at 1044. 
 13.  Id. (alteration in original). 
 14.  See id. at 1042–44 (discussing the denial of various licenses to felons without 
distinguishing between the kinds of offenses for which they were convicted). 
 15.  Id. at 1044. 
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scrutiny and therefore is immune to constitutional attack.16  Although 
Darks pleaded guilty to the offenses without advisement from counsel or 
warning that he would be denied future occupational licenses, the court 
found no due process violations.17 
A few years after the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Darks v. City of 
Cincinnati, Dr. Ira Gore purchased what he believed to be a brand-new 
black BMW sedan for $40,750.88 from a Birmingham, Alabama BMW 
dealer.18  Nine months later, he took the car to “Slick Finish,” a car 
detailer, for the purposes of making his new BMW look “snazzier than it 
normally would appear.”19  The owner of the detailing company, Mr. 
Slick, noticed that the car had been repainted.20  Feeling cheated, Dr. 
Gore sued BMW alleging that BMW had defrauded him by failing to 
disclose that the car had been repainted.21  An Alabama jury agreed, 
finding BMW liable for $4,000 in compensatory damages22 and also 
finding that BMW’s nondisclosure policy constituted “gross, oppressive, 
[and] malicious” fraud, thereby granting Dr. Gore $4 million in punitive 
damages.23  The Alabama Supreme Court reduced the award to $2 
million to make it “constitutionally reasonable.”24 
Six years later the United States Supreme Court held Dr. Gore’s $2 
million punitive damages award “grossly excessive.”25  Finding that 
BMW “did not receive adequate notice of the magnitude of the 
sanction”26 that might be imposed by the State of Alabama, the Court 
                                                          
 16.  See id. at 1043–44 (stating that the ordinance had rational basis support and thus did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause).  
 17.  Id. at 1044. 
 18.  See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563 (1996). 
 19.  Id. (quoting BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 621 (Ala. 1994), rev’d, 517 U.S. 
559 (1996)). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See id. at 563 & n.3 (stating Dr. Gore argued that the failure to disclose that the car had 
been repainted constituted the “suppression of a material fact”). 
 22.  Id. at 565.  Dr. Gore sued BMW for $500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.  Id. 
at 563.  At trial he claimed $4,000 in actual damages proven through the testimony of a BMW 
dealer.  Id. at 564.  The dealer testified that a repainted BMW was valued at 10% less than a brand 
new BMW.  Id. 
 23.  Id. (quoting ALA. CODE §§ 6-11-20 to -21 (1993)).  To prove punitive damages, Dr. Gore 
provided evidence that BMW had sold close to 1,000 repainted cars in the United States in the 
preceding seven years.  Id.  With that, Dr. Gore assessed the appropriate punitive damages award at 
$4 million, the value of his actual damages multiplied by the number of repainted cars BMW sold.  
Id. 
 24.  Id. at 567 (quoting Gore, 646 So. 2d at 629). 
 25.  Id. at 575. 
 26.  Id. at 574–75. 
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held the judgment violative of due process.27  For the Court, 
“[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional 
jurisprudence dictate[d] that a person receive fair notice not only of the 
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of 
the penalty that a state may impose.”28  Although BMW is a multibillion-
dollar corporation with a number of U.S. corporate offices complete with 
in-house counsel that could have easily researched and informed the 
company of the punitive damages laws in the fifty states,29 the Court 
determined that BMW did not receive fair notice that a first violation of 
the Alabama Deceptive Practices Act would subject it to a multimillion-
dollar punitive damages judgment.30 
Unlike the substantive due process review granted to BMW, Mr. 
Darks, our potential dance hall licensee, received no hearing, nor was he 
allowed to rebut Cincinnati’s presumption that felony convictions 
demonstrate the felon’s lack of moral integrity and disrespect for the law.  
Even if Mr. Darks received the chance, the irrebuttable presumption 
doctrine would offer him no relief as the Supreme Court has reasoned 
away any protection under that doctrine.31  Mr. Darks was also not 
entitled to proportionality review balancing his crimes—nonviolent 
offenses—against the potential lifetime licensing disqualification.  
Moreover, there was no pragmatic consideration of Mr. Darks’s practical 
ability to “know” or have “fair notice” of potential state penalties that 
attach to the status of “felon.”  In other words, how was Mr. Darks to 
know that because of his past felonies he would be stricken from 
participating in the economy in the future?  Trial courts are not 
constitutionally required to include a warning of the employment 
consequences of conviction during a plea colloquy.32  Neither is defense 
counsel mandated to warn her client of these penalties.33 
                                                          
 27.  Id. at 575. 
 28.  Id. at 574 (emphasis added). 
 29.  Company Information, BMW N. AM., http://www.bmwusa.com/Standard/Content/ 
CompanyInformation/BMWGroupinNA.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
 30.  Gore, 517 U.S. at 585. 
 31.  See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119–20 (1989) (denying the right to a 
hearing in a paternity case where it was the state’s substantive policy to deny inquiries into 
“paternity that would be destructive of family integrity and privacy.”). 
 32.  United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1963) (listing several areas in which 
collateral consequences can have important legal significance, but also stating that a “full 
understanding” of the consequences of a guilty plea is not understood to mean a contemporaneous 
realization by the defendant of all possible collateral consequences). 
 33.  Id. 
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Today there are approximately 38,000 statutory and regulatory 
disqualifications triggered solely by the fact of prior felony conviction.34  
This amounts to an average of 700 per jurisdiction, and it is estimated 
that 65% of these are employment related.35  This statutory phenomenon 
is typically called “collateral consequences”36 and has been discussed 
among scholars in the academy for the last twenty years. 
To date, numerous challenges have been brought contesting both 
occupational license restrictions and employment disqualifications.  
Equal protection challenges almost always fail.  Because felons are not a 
suspect class and employment and occupational freedom are not 
“fundamental right[s],” the balancing test typically weighs in favor of the 
state, with the court finding a state’s legitimate interest in “safety” or 
“health” outweighing the individual’s interest in earning a livelihood.37  
Due process challenges have also been levied against employment and 
licensing restrictions.  Procedural due process challenges typically fail 
because courts presume notice and defer to state legislatures to determine 
the type and scope of discretion to give department employees in making 
licensing decisions.38  Although there are a few exceptions, most courts 
do not find in favor of the ex-offender even if the statute or regulation is 
obviously unfair, irrational, and overinclusive.39  With this, it is time to 
look for other avenues by which to challenge occupational collateral 
consequences of a felony conviction.  In an era of mass incarceration, 
historically high rates of criminal recidivism, and massive government 
expenditures on crime and punishment, a focus on the occupational and 
employment opportunities of ex-offenders translates into taxpayer 
                                                          
 34.  Christopher Gowen et al., The ABA’s Approach to Juvenile Justice Reform: Education, 
Eviction, and Employment: The Collateral Consequences of Juvenile Adjudications, A.B.A. CRIM. 
JUST. SEC., June 2011, at 1, 1–2, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal 
justice/jj_gowen.authcheckdam.doc. 
 35.  Id. at 2. 
 36.  Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal 
Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 253 (2002). 
 37.  In no way am I asserting that all collateral consequences are substantively bad.  It is quite 
clear that in some instances governments should prohibit individuals convicted of specific crimes 
from engaging in certain occupations to protect the safety and welfare of their citizens, such as 
preventing individuals with a history of sex offenses from driving a school bus.  It should also be 
clear that I assert that, if this is the case, then an individual pleading guilty to an offense ought to be 
warned by the court that she will be disqualified from this specific occupation. 
 38.  See, e.g., Bhalero v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l Regs., 834 F. Supp. 2d. 775, 787 (N.D. Ill. 
2011) (finding that a physician who had his license reprimanded due to a misdemeanor conviction 
received due process from licensing board in part because of the process afforded him at his criminal 
trial). 
 39.  See, e.g., Darks v. City of Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040, 1044 (6th Cir. 1984). 
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savings, an increase in state and federal revenue, and a more productive 
citizenry. 
This Article advocates for reform of the current occupational 
licensing policies of the several states on behalf of the nonviolent 
offender.  The additional restrictions and special conditions presented by 
violent offenders, sex offenders, and immigrant populations are beyond 
the scope of this Article.  For purposes of this Article, the definition of 
“nonviolent” is the inverse definition of “violent” taken from the Armed 
Career Criminal Act.40  I chose this Act due to the congressional 
guidance it offers regarding the legislative intent on legal elements that 
define nonviolent offenses.  Thus, a nonviolent offender is an individual 
who has been convicted of a crime that does not have an element 
requiring “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person of another.”41  This includes individuals convicted of 
smaller property crimes and drug trafficking, drug possession, or both.  
The current focus on nonviolent offenders also has an economic savings 
component.  Current estimates of the U.S. prison population demonstrate 
that nonviolent offenders comprise at least half of all American 
inmates.42  Recommendations in this article would have quite a 
significant impact not only on a number of nonviolent ex-offenders, but 
also on government expenditures and taxpayer savings.  Finally, it is 
critical to understand that this thesis focuses on the ex-offender who 
garners a felony conviction through plea bargaining as opposed to 
conviction by criminal trial.  This is significant as this thesis understands 
plea bargaining as a process in which the ex-offender must carefully 
weigh and consider all information regarding sanctions and penalties to 
make a rational choice.  Without all of the information up front, an ex-
offender will fail to understand the severity of the penalties she faces 
outside of the criminal context. 
                                                          
 40.  THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF 
AMERICA’S PRISONS (Apr. 2011) [hereinafter PEW CTR., STATE OF RECIDIVISM], 
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2011/Pew_State_of_Recidivism.pdf; THE PEW 
CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 6 (Feb. 2008) [hereinafter 
PEW CTR., ONE IN 100], http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2008/one%20in% 
20100.pdf; MATTHEW R. DUROSE & CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, FACT SHEET: PROFILE OF NONVIOLENT OFFENDERS EXITING STATE PRISONS 
(Oct. 2004), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pnoesp.pdf. 
 41.  See Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) (2006) (listing felonies 
that do not qualify as serious violent felonies for purposes of sentencing). 
 42.  PAUL GUERINO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISONERS IN 2010, at 1 (Dec. 2011), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf 
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This Article applies recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area 
of punitive damages to that of occupational licensing restrictions 
triggered by a felony conviction.  By using the framework constructed to 
evaluate the constitutionality of large punitive damages awards and 
applying those principles to occupational licensing statutes, it becomes 
clear that many occupational licensing statutes disqualifying those 
individuals with a prior felony conviction are constitutionally suspect.  
This Article adds to the scholarly debate by attempting to construct a 
solution founded in principles used to evaluate constitutional issues in 
the punitive damages context.  Much of the existing literature focuses on 
the problems of mass incarceration, collateral consequences, and 
expenditures on recidivism.  This Article understands this problem exists 
and is interested in uncovering potential constitutional challenges to 
these burgeoning socioeconomic issues. 
Part II of this Article examines the problem, namely an incarceration 
crisis exacerbated by the revolving door of criminal recidivism.  This 
section also includes a partial solution to this problem: employment of 
ex-offenders.  Part III places the issue in context by surveying current 
constitutional doctrine regarding an individual’s occupational freedoms, 
how the Supreme Court has handled collateral consequences in other 
contexts, precedent on the constitutionality of occupational licensing 
restrictions based on felony convictions, and the current constitutional 
challenges that have been tried and failed on this exact issue.  Current 
doctrine is mixed and opaque at best.  Part IV discusses the way in which 
BMW v. Gore, a highly criticized Supreme Court opinion, can be used to 
ameliorate many of the severe and often irrational occupational licensing 
and employment disqualifications based solely on the fact of conviction.  
This section argues that the framework and principles crafted in BMW v. 
Gore and its progeny ought to have the ability to transcend punitive 
damages and apply successfully to other areas of constitutional concern 
in the civil context.  To fully demonstrate the analysis, Part IV employs a 
hypothetical based on a Wisconsin occupational licensing regulation.  
Part V assesses counterarguments to this line of reasoning including the 
idea that the reform of occupational and employment disqualifications 
ought to be left to legislatures, and that challenges to such statutes should 
be brought under the Eighth or Sixth Amendments instead of due 
process.  Finally, this Article concludes with a brief summary and 
thoughts of next steps in the challenge against occupational and 
employment disqualifications for nonviolent ex-offenders. 
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II. EMPLOYMENT CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION 
Something as simple as checking a box indicating a conviction bars a 
person from employment, housing, educational assistance, and 
government benefits.  The employment consequences of conviction take 
the form of automatic or discretionary disqualifications in the public and 
private sectors.43 
The theoretical underpinnings of these penalties are considered as 
preventing crime and providing a denunciatory purpose and retributive 
function.44  These abstract justifications do less to serve the stated 
objectives and more to provide a strong argument for the designation of 
collateral consequences as part of the sentencing court’s punishment for 
the original offense.45  Moreover, this “web” of obstacles significantly 
contributes to the current recidivism rate.46  The ex-offender faces a 
double penalty: she pays her debt through incarceration and further pays 
through loss of life opportunity.47  This opportunity cost is 
socioeconomic, political, and seemingly never ending. 
Employment is fundamental to the American identity.  It is a 
prerequisite to membership in American society48 and is essential to the 
survival of the American family.  An individual who fails to join the 
labor market is socioeconomically disadvantaged, stigmatized, and 
socially marred.49  Any serious departure from current “mass 
incarceration policies will ultimately depend on the expansion of 
employment opportunities for low-skilled [new releasees], and a 
reinvigoration of the moral status of these men in the political debate.”50 
                                                          
 43.  Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 
595–98 (2006); Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in 
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 22–23 
(Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); see also Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller, 
Collateral Civil Penalties as Techniques of Social Policy, in  CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL 
CONSEQUENCES 9, 21 (Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller eds., 2005) (discussing impact of civil 
penalties). 
 44.  Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral 
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 160 (1999). 
 45.  Id.  
 46.  H.R. REP. NO. 110-140, at 2 (2007), reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 24, 25.  
 47.  Marlaina Freisthler & Mark A. Godsey, Going Home to Stay: A Review of Collateral 
Consequences of Conviction, Post-Incarceration Employment, and Recidivism in Ohio, 36 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 525, 525–26 (2005). 
 48.  Demleitner, supra note 44, at 156. 
 49.  Freisthler & Godsey, supra note 47, at 531–32. 
 50.  Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality, and the Future of Mass 
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In some cases, employment and occupational licensing restrictions 
are necessary to protect the public.  In the context of employment, the 
most obvious example is the sex-offender pedophile prohibited from 
driving an elementary school bus.  In such a case, an employment 
restriction is necessary to prevent contact between the offender and 
children.  More importantly there is a reasonable relationship between 
the underlying criminal conduct, pedophilia, and the occupational duties, 
including daily interaction with young children.  In such a case, an 
employment prohibition makes sense.  However, most offenders are not 
pedophile sex offenders and in most cases collateral consequences do 
less to protect the public and more to interject a sense of frustration and 
hopelessness in the ex-offender, particularly in instances where there is 
either no nexus or a minimal connection between the disqualifying 
conviction and the desired employment. 
Lack of employment is a primary factor in criminal recidivism and 
the most severe post-conviction penalty.51  “Many ex-offenders released 
from prison face this obstacle head-on and are repeatedly rejected, 
denied, and virtually excluded from the qualified applicant pool based 
solely on their previous conviction.”52  Numerous studies have reported a 
positive correlation between employment and recidivism.53  These are 
discussed in more detail in the subsequent subsection. 
In general, new releasees face high levels of unemployment as well 
as below-average wages.54  On average, “incarceration reduced 
subsequent wages by 11%, cut annual employment by nine weeks and 
reduced yearly earnings by 40%.”55  When years of work experience are 
statistically controlled, the results change very little.56  The implication is 
                                                                                                                       
 
Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 852 (2009). 
 51.  Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Section 
of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1719 (2003). 
 52.  Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-Violent 
Federal Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 165 (2010). 
 53.  MILES D. HARER, OFFICE OF RESEARCH & EVALUATION, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 
RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1987 (1994) [hereinafter HARER STUDY], 
http://www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/recidivism/oreprrecid87.pdf; 
Christopher Uggen, Work as a Turning Point in the Life Course of Criminals: A Duration Model of 
Age, Employment, and Recidivism, 67 AM. SOCIO. REV. 529 (2000). 
 54.  BRUCE WESTERN & BECKY PETIT, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, COLLATERAL COSTS: 
INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 11 (2010), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploaded 
Files/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic_Mobility/Collateral%20Costs%20FINAL.pdf?n=5996. 
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id.  
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that the economic consequences result from conviction and incarceration 
rather than “work experience lost while imprisoned.”57  With this, the 
first order of business is to explore proactive measures connecting 
releasees with employment.58 
This section of the Article seeks to explore the various facets of 
employment consequences of conviction.  It begins by surveying a 
number of empirical studies that demonstrate a link between employment 
and a decline in criminal recidivism.  Section B examines statutory 
disqualifications triggered by a felony conviction while section C looks 
at employers’ unwillingness to hire individuals with a felony conviction.  
Section D discusses the racial implications of disqualifying employment 
policies.  Finally, this part of the Article looks to current government 
responses to the employment consequences of conviction. 
A. Employment and Recidivism 
Numerous recidivism studies have been conducted in recent years.  
For example, the Bureau of Justice Statistics report of 2002 and the 2011 
Pew Center study provided scholars, advocates, and policymakers with 
valuable insight into the cross-national rate of recidivism.59  However, 
these studies primarily focused on reporting convictions, types of re-
arrest and reconviction, as well as how previous sentences served as 
predictors for future criminal behavior.60  These factors fail to account 
for how outside socioeconomic factors such as employment, education, 
and civic participation influence the rate of recidivism. 
In contrast, the last formal study conducted by the Bureau of Prisons, 
known as the Harer Study, published in 1994, did.61  According to the 
Harer Study, post-release employment is a determinative factor in the 
successful reintegration of ex-offenders.  The majority of incarcerating 
and recidivating crimes consist of drug trafficking, theft, and larceny, 
which suggests that many offenses are committed with an economic 
objective.62  In the Harer Study, ex-offenders, who arranged for post-
                                                          
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 22. 
 59.  PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 (2002), http://bjs.ojp. 
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf; PEW CTR., STATE OF RECIDIVISM, supra note 40. 
 60.  See LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 59; PEW CTR., STATE OF RECIDIVISM, supra note 40.  
 61.  HARER STUDY, supra note 53. 
 62.  Id. at 52; see also LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 59, at 8 (finding similar results among 
those with the highest re-arrest rates who were originally incarcerated for committing economic 
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release employment, had a recidivism rate of 27.6% compared to 53.9% 
of those without employment.63  Therefore, post-release employment 
appears to cut the recidivism rate by close to half.64 
Sociologist Christopher Uggen’s recent study supports the Harer 
Study findings.  Using older data from the National Supported Work 
Demonstration Project, Uggen analyzed the work effect on the rate of 
recidivism.65  He reported a 24% reduction in recidivism for participants 
in the work program aged twenty-six and older.66  This is quite 
significant as it suggests that employment is an important turning point 
in the “life course” of offenders over twenty-six years old.67 
Other studies, reports, and programs demonstrate similar findings.  
One study, conducted by Stephen Tripodi at Florida State University 
reported that recidivists who found work when released from prison 
decreased their chances of recidivism by 68.5%.68  Recidivists with 
employment averaged 31.4 months before re-incarceration while 
recidivists who failed to obtain employment averaged 17.3 months 
before re-incarceration.69  The Newark Prisoner Reentry Initiative, a 
federal Department of Labor funded program aimed at securing 
employment and vocational training for releasees, boasts a less than 10% 
reduction in participants’ rate of recidivism after one year.70 
Also significant is the Harer Study’s finding that those offenders 
released to a halfway house prior to being released to the community 
were more successful than those directly released.  This is because 
halfway houses increase the likelihood of obtaining post-release 
employment.71  Of the 614 people in the sample who went to halfway 
houses, 68.1% obtained employment compared to 22% of those released 
directly into the community.72  There is, therefore, strong evidence that 
                                                                                                                       
 
crimes, with an exception to that pattern being drug traffickers with an average re-arrest rate). 
 63.  HARER STUDY, supra note 53, at 4–5. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Uggen, supra note 53, at 532–33. 
 66.  Id. at 534. 
 67.  Id. at 542. 
 68.  Poster, Stephen J. Tripodi, Fla. State Univ., Coll. of Social Work, http://www.research. 
fsu.edu/crc/FYAP/posters/Tripodi_FYAP_Poster_Final.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2012). 
 69.  Id.  
 70.  Corey Booker, Let’s Break the Cycle of Re-Arrest and Re-Imprisonment, N.J. VOICES 
GUEST BLOG (Jan. 3, 2010, 5:55 AM), http://blog.nj.com/njv_guest_blog/2010/01/lets_break_the_ 
cycle_of_re-arr.html. 
 71.  HARER STUDY, supra note 53, at 63–66.  
 72.  Id. at 3–4. 
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employment is critical to the success of a new releasee.73  Education and 
family support are also key factors in a smooth transition from prison to 
the community.74 
B. Statutory Disqualifications 
Once out of prison, ex-offenders have fewer employment 
opportunities and experience a decreased lifetime earning potential.75  
The “wage penalty” of imprisonment is estimated somewhere between 
10% and 20%.76  This is attributed not only to the lack of skills and work 
experience that characterize the typical ex-offender, but also the 
stigmatization and statutory employment restrictions facing ex-
offenders.77 
As evidence of its commitment to the War on Drugs and the “tough 
on crime” stance of the 1980s, the federal government and several states 
implemented a number of occupational restrictions affecting ex-
offenders.78  These restrictions have assumed the form of blanket 
                                                          
 73.  Id. at 63–64; see also CHRISTY VISHER ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POL’Y CTR., 
EMPLOYMENT AFTER PRISON: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF RELEASEES IN THREE STATES 8 (2008), 
http://urban.org/UploadedPDF/411778_employment_after_prison.pdf. 
 74.  Education also plays an important role in success.  The Harer Study demonstrated that 
recidivism is inversely related to education level.  HARER STUDY, supra note 53, at 13.  Those 
offenders entering prison with an education of eighth grade or less who participated in Adult Basic 
Education and GED courses had a lower recidivism rate than those who opted out.  Id.  The same is 
true of those entering prison with some high school education and participating in Adult Continuing 
Education, Post-Secondary Education, and Adult Basic Education.  Id.  A more recent study 
published in 2003 found similar results, with those offenders who participated in educational 
programming having a statistically significant lower rate of recidivism overall.  STEPHEN J. STEURER 
& LINDA G. SMITH, EDUCATION REDUCES CRIME: THREE-STATE RECIDIVISM STUDY: EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 12 (2003), http://www.ceanational.org/PDFs/EdReducesCrime.pdf. 
Family and spousal support is just as determinative as education.  The Harer Study reported 
that those releasees living with a spouse post-release recidivated at a rate of 20%, while those with 
other living arrangements recidivated at a rate of 47.9%.  HARER STUDY, supra note 53, at 5–6.  
Moreover, recent research suggests that tangible and emotional familial support and spending time 
with children are associated with lower rates of recidivism.  Rebecca L. Naser & Nancy G. La 
Vigne, Family Support in the Prisoner Reentry Process: Expectations and Realities, 43 J. OFFENDER 
REHAB. 93, 94–95 (2008).  Family tends to be the primary source of socioeconomic stability for 
newly released offenders. 
 75.  JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POL’Y CTR., FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE 
DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY 31–34 (2001), http://www.urban.org/ 
UploadedPDF/from_prison_to_home.pdf.  
 76.  Id. at 32. 
 77.  Travis, supra note 43, at 22. 
 78.  See Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America “The Land of Second 
Chances”: Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-Offenders, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
527, 532–39 (2006) (discussing state employment restrictions); Pinard & Thompson, supra note 43, 
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prohibitions based on an individual’s status as a convicted felon.79  For 
example, the state code in Ohio includes 404 statutory collateral 
consequences.80  Of these 404 sanctions, 291 of them are employment 
related.81  Many other states have similar sanctions embedded in their 
state codes.  A recent study conducted by the American Bar 
Association’s (ABA’s) Criminal Justice Section catalogued over 38,000 
statutes nationwide imposing collateral consequences on individuals.82  
Of this number, 65% were employment consequences.83 
Licensing restrictions result in the loss of new employment and act 
as a bar on reemployment in the occupation the offender was employed 
in prior to conviction.84  Federal law provides for the suspension and 
revocation of numerous licenses including commercial motor vehicle 
operator licenses,85 pilots’ licenses (called airmen certificates),86 
hazardous materials equipment licenses (from local trash collectors to 
interstate trucking companies carrying nuclear waste),87 broadcasting 
licenses,88 and port workers’ transportation worker identification 
credential.89  This list is by no means exhaustive.  States restrict 
occupational licenses as well by denying or revoking certain types of 
licenses based strictly on a felony criminal conviction.  For example, 
North Carolina90 and New Hampshire91 deny, suspend, or revoke barber 
licenses based on felony convictions while Wisconsin denies security 
guard licensing.92 
                                                                                                                       
 
at 596 (stating in the 1980s a number of states restricted employment opportunities for ex-offenders 
to show they were tough on crime).  
 79.  Pinard & Thompson, supra note 43, at 596. 
 80.  Kimberly R. Mossoney & Cara A. Roecker, Ohio Collateral Consequences Project: 
Executive Summary, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 611, 615 (2005). 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Letter from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen. of the U.S., to William H. Sorrell, Attorney Gen. of 
Vt. (April 18, 2011), http://onlawyering.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/VT-Attorney-General-
Sorrell.0001-1.pdf. 
 83.  Gowen, supra note 34, at 2. 
 84.  See Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45 
B.C. L. REV. 255, 282 (2004). 
 85.  49 U.S.C. § 31310 (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405 (West 2012). 
 86.  Id. § 44710; 14 C.F.R. § 61.15 (2010). 
 87.  49 U.S.C. § 5103a. 
 88.  47 C.F.R. § 73.4280. 
 89.  46 U.S.C. § 70105; 49 C.F.R. §§ 1515.7, 1572.103. 
 90.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 86A-18(1) (West 2012).   
 91.  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 313-A:22, II(b) (West 2005). 
 92.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 440.26(2)(c)2 (West 2012). 
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Other federal and state license restrictions are put forth as necessary 
“to foster high professional standards,” while limitations on employment 
opportunities are said to guarantee that those hired have “good moral 
character.”93  Suspensions and revocations placed on the licenses of 
commodity dealers,94 customs brokers,95 and SEC registrants (brokers 
and dealers)96 are examples where “good moral character” comes into 
play.  All of the above statutes and regulations require criminal 
background checks and make a conviction a basis for denial.  
Surprisingly, an ex-offender has a better chance of becoming an attorney 
than a security guard in Wisconsin or barber in North Carolina.  Only 
five states prohibit felons from practicing law,97 while felons are barred 
from over 800 occupations nationwide.98  Collectively, statutory 
restrictions contribute to an ex-offender unemployment rate of at least 
60% one year after release.99 
C. Unwillingness to Hire 
One of the most common problems associated with access-to-work 
issues is the unwillingness of employers to hire an individual with a 
criminal record.  A number of empirical studies conducted over the past 
fifteen years demonstrate that approximately 60% of employers 
“probably or definitely would not” even consider hiring an individual 
with a criminal history.100  Employers are more reluctant to hire ex-
                                                          
 93.  Demleitner, supra note 44, at 156 (quoting Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. 
REV. 403, 406 (1967); Neil P. Cohen & Dean Hill Riukin, Civil Disabilities: The Forgotten 
Punishment, 35 FED. PROBATION 19, 21 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 94.  7 U.S.C. § 12a(2). 
 95.  19 U.S.C. § 1641(d). 
 96.  15 U.S.C. 78o. 
 97.  Paul Davies, The High Bar for Redemption, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2007, at A1 (reporting 
that “Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Oregon, and Texas prohibit felons from practicing law”).  
 98.  Shawn D. Bushway & Gary Sweeten, Abolish Lifetime Bans for Ex-Felons, 6 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUBLIC POL’Y 697, 698 (2007). 
 99.  Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Return to the Community: Political, Economic, and Social 
Consequences, SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS, Nov. 2000, at 3, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ 
184253.pdf. 
 100.  DEVAH PAGER & BRUCE WESTERN, INVESTIGATING PRISONER REENTRY: THE IMPACT OF 
CONVICTION STATUS ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS OF YOUNG MEN 20 (2009), 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228584.pdf (the study was conducted in New York City); 
Devah Pager & Lincoln Quillian, Walking the Talk? What Employers Say Versus What They Do, 70 
AM. SOC. REV. 355, 363 (2005); see also Harry J. Holzer et al., Will Employers Hire Ex-Offenders? 
Employer Preferences, Background Checks and Their Determinants, in IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE 
SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION 205 (Mary Patillo et al. eds., 2001) (surveying 
employers from 1993–1994 in four cities: Boston, Atlanta, Detroit, and Los Angeles, finding 
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offenders than any other commonly stigmatized groups including the 
disabled, welfare recipients, or applicants with gaps in employment 
history.101  The underlying concerns of this marginalization from the 
applicant pool include fears of physical safety, theft, and the desire to 
avoid interaction with probation officers.102  One study published in 2009 
uncovered that the majority of employers are more concerned about 
behavioral problems than negligent hiring liability.103  Tax incentives and 
federal bonding—government provided incentives for the hiring of ex-
offenders—are seriously underutilized reintegrative tools.104 
D. Racial Implications 
Princeton Professor and sociologist Devah Pager conducted a study 
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin demonstrating how a criminal conviction 
works against black men more harshly than their white counterparts.105  
Pager’s study clearly shows that criminal convictions have a devastating 
effect on the employment prospects of young black males with criminal 
convictions in America. 
The study was an employment audit conducted with four male 
testers: two blacks and two whites.106  The testers were paired by race; 
the two black testers formed one team and the two white testers formed 
the second team.107  Within each team, one auditor was randomly 
assigned a “criminal record” for the first week; the pair rotated the ex-
offender role for each successive week of employment searches, such 
that each tester served in the criminal record condition for an equal 
number of cases.108  “[T]he criminal record consisted of a felony drug 
conviction (possession with intent to distribute cocaine) and eighteen 
                                                                                                                       
 
exclusion rates of 60%). 
 101.  Harry J. Holzer et al., Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial 
Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J. L. & ECON. 451, 453 (2006). 
 102.  PAGER & WESTERN, supra note 100, at 23–25. 
 103.  Id. at 28. 
 104.  See id. at 29–30 (“Though only a small minority of employers . . . use tax credits and 
federal bonding, these incentives do appear to increase employers’ willingness to continue hiring ex-
offenders in the future.”). 
 105.  Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime, and Getting a Job, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 617, 
641 (2005). 
 106.  Id. at 631. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
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months of served prison time.”109  The testers applied for real job 
openings in entry-level positions to see whether employers responded 
differently to applications on the basis of selected characteristics.110  The 
results of the study demonstrated that a criminal record reduced the 
likelihood of a callback by 50%.111  The callback rate was 34% for 
whites with no criminal record, 17% for whites with a criminal record, 
14% for blacks without a criminal record, and 5% for blacks with a 
criminal record.112 
E. Government Responses 
This “employment penalty” has developed into a major 
socioeconomic problem for entire communities.  The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is adamant about requiring a 
connection between the disqualifying conviction and the employment 
duties, thus ensuring fairness and preventing discrimination.113  Only a 
handful of states, however, currently require any type of relationship test 
for the nature of the underlying conviction and occupational duties.114  
One of the problems of challenging employment and occupational 
disqualification is that ex-offenders as a political block lack the political 
capital and cohesiveness necessary to facilitate interest by state and 
federal legislators.  Moreover, there is a notion of extreme political risk 
associated with the advancement of interests of felons and convicts.  It is 
considered a “soft on crime” approach,115 particularly if the basis for 
reform is fairness as opposed to taxpayer savings and reduced 
government expenditures. 
                                                          
 109.  Id. at 633. 
 110.  Id. at 629. 
 111.  Id. at 641. 
 112.  Id. at 641–43. 
 113.  U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL 15-29–15-30 
(2006), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.pdf; U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, TITLE VII: USE OF CONVICTION RECORDS IN HIRING (2008), available at http://www.eeoc. 
gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2008/titlevii_use_conviction_hiring.html. 
 114.  See LEGAL ACTION CTR., OVERVIEW OF STATE LAWS THAT BAN DISCRIMINATION BY 
EMPLOYERS, http://www.lac.org/toolkits/standards/Fourteen_State_Laws.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 
2012) (outlining fourteen states that have laws prohibiting employment discrimination of ex-
offenders). 
 115.  See Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment Problem, 
40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 78 (2008) (discussing the challenge to prison reform in the context of prison 
overcrowding). 
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Social organizations and advocacy groups across the country have 
been working with municipal and state legislatures to “Ban the Box” on 
employment applications for work in public-sector positions.116  “Ban the 
Box” is an initiative that encourages employers to abandon the criminal-
conviction question on employment applications.117  An employer should 
ask a prospective employee the question only after choosing her for a 
second interview.  Major cities, such as Boston and Chicago, have 
enacted rules requiring city employers to review an applicant’s 
qualifications prior to conducting a background check.118  Entire states, 
such as Illinois and Kansas, are following suit with similar legislation.119 
Mayors across the country have begun to invest in reentry initiatives 
that aim to put ex-offenders back to work.120  In New York, Mayor 
Bloomberg has led the reentry effort by forming private sector 
intermediaries to place probationers in jobs that pay a living wage.121  
Chicago engages in something similar except there job placement is open 
to all ex-offenders.122  Corey Booker, Mayor of Newark, has instituted an 
aggressive work-first program funded by the Department of Labor and 
blessed with broad bipartisan support.123  Additionally, Booker persuaded 
300 lawyers to donate their services to ex-offenders facing legal 
obstacles to employment, offered tax breaks to companies that hire ex-
offenders, and has decided to sell city land at a discount price to 
developers willing to hire ex-offenders on their construction sites.124  
Entire states have also joined the reintegrative employment efforts.  In 
2003, Michigan launched the Michigan Prisoner Reentry Initiative 
(MPRI) and expanded it statewide in 2008.125  Prior to parole or release, 
offenders are transferred to a reentry facility where a transition plan is 
                                                          
 116.  See Ban the Box, ALL OF US OR NONE, http://www.allofusornone.org/campaigns/ban-the-
box (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).  
 117.  Id. 
 118.  NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, MAJOR U.S. CITIES AND COUNTIES ADOPT HIRING POLICIES 
TO REMOVE UNFAIR BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 2–13 (2010), 
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/2010/PromisingLocalHireReentryPolicies.pdf?nocdn=1.   
 119.  See H.R.J. Res. 107, 94th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-
4710 (2008). 
 120.  Kimberly Hendrickson, Reentry Programs for Ex-Prisoners Show Promise, EXAMINER 
(Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/reentr-programs-for-ex-prisoners-show-prom 
ise/article/37525#.uotw-1Q1e1s. 
 121.  Id.  
 122.  Id.  
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Andrew Jacobs, Seeking the Key to Employment for Ex-Cons, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, 
at A31. 
 125.  PEW CTR., STATE OF RECIDIVISM, supra note 40, at 21. 
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created and implemented ensuring employment opportunity and housing 
placement upon release.126 
A number of states have expungement or sealing mechanisms, 
judicial petitions for expungement, deferred prosecution arrangements, 
and alternative sanctions for law breakers.127  These procedures allow a 
criminal defendant to deny a conviction in the case of expungement and 
sealing or avoid a conviction altogether in the instance of a deferred 
prosecution.  A few states offer “certificates of rehabilitation” that may 
restore some or all of the legal rights lost upon conviction.128  Also, a few 
states permit the presumption of rehabilitation after the passage of 
time.129 
Not all states are developing employment strategies for their ex-
offending population, and even the states that are still have state codes 
replete with employment restrictions and automatic occupational 
licensing disqualifications based solely on conviction.  Any legislative 
conversation must begin with repealing or modifying such statutes to 
facilitate successful reentry.  If legislatures fail to take the initiative, then 
courts must step in to signal the need for serious constitutional review of 
such laws. 
Employment and occupational opportunities for ex-offenders are 
important not only for the individual but also for the health of our nation 
both socially and economically.  Out-of-work ex-offenders do not make 
for a safer community.  Instead, the unemployment rate of felons 
contributes to high criminal recidivism and increased corrections 
expenditures, paid for with taxpayer dollars. 
Occupational licenses provide a means through which ex-offenders 
may avoid employer biases and earn a legitimate income.  While some 
occupational licenses may be necessary to genuinely protect the public 
(as with the pedophile bus driver example), many times such restrictions 
have no real rational relationship either to public safety or the underlying 
occupational duties. 
                                                          
 126.  Id.  
 127.  April Fazier & Margaret Love, Certificates of Rehabilitation and Other Forms of Relief 
from the Collateral Consequences of Conviction: A Survey of State Laws, in ABA COMM’N ON 
EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, SECOND CHANCES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: 
ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION AND REENTRY STRATEGIES 50, 50 (2007), http://www.pardon 
law.com/materials/rev_2ndchance(3).pdf. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 52–53 (finding Arkansas, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, and North Dakota all 
presume rehabilitation with the passage of time). 
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III. DUE PROCESS & CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
A. The Right to Work: A “very important ‘liberty’ interest” 
In McDonald v. Chicago, Justice Stevens, author of BMW v. Gore130 
and Padilla v Kentucky,131 discussed below, reminded the Court that 
substantive due process is a matter of individual liberty.132  In a stern 
dissent, Justice Stevens discussed the liberty clause as a constitutional 
“‘promise’ that a measure of dignity and self-rule will be afforded [to] all 
persons.”133  Recognizing that “process” implies strict procedural 
analysis, Justice Stevens asserted that substance and process are 
intertwined, thus permitting the constitutional interpretation of due 
process as giving substance to the word “liberty” as it relates to “due 
process.”134  Furthermore, substantive due process analysis, for Justice 
Stevens, is a forward-looking methodology.135  Citing Lawrence v. Texas 
and Michael H. v. Gerald D., Justice Stevens understood the analysis to 
consider the sociopolitical landscape of a modern society.136  Although 
occupational freedom or a “right to work” has never been recognized by 
the Court as a fundamental right, it has deep roots in the American 
conception of “ordered liberty,” and in today’s society individuals are 
adjudged according to their occupation.  Most importantly, Justice 
Stevens found it to be the Court’s responsibility to safeguard individual 
liberty as opposed to leaving it to “majoritarian political processes.”137  
He considered it “judicial abdication” to grant substantial legislative 
deference on the issue of the liberty guarantee in the Due Process 
Clause.138  It is important to understand this conception as applicable not 
only in some contexts but in all questions that the Supreme Court faces. 
In the 1798 Supreme Court case Calder v. Bull,139 Justice Samuel 
Chase pronounced a set of laws not to be categorically entrusted to 
legislative authority: 
                                                          
 130.  517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 131.  130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 132.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3091–92 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 133.  Id. at 3092 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)). 
 134.  Id. at 3090. 
 135.  Id. at 3099. 
 136.  Id. at 3096 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 
491 U.S. 110, 127–28 (1989)).  
 137.  Id. at 3099. 
 138.  Id.  
 139.  3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
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A law that . . . impairs[] the lawful private contracts of citizens; a law 
that makes a man a Judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property 
from []A and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a 
people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH [sic] powers; and, therefore, 
it cannot be presumed that they have done it.140 
The Court has put forth a number of constitutionally protected time-
honored rights including “the right of the individual to contract, to 
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful 
knowledge . . . and generally to enjoy those privileges long 
recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men.”141  It has also asserted that “ineligibility for employment in a 
major sector of the economy [] is of sufficient significance to be 
characterized as a deprivation of an interest in liberty.”142  When the 
opportunity to work is at risk of being foreclosed, the government is 
prevented from favoring some citizens over others.143  The state is 
prohibited from excluding persons from any occupation in a manner that 
contravenes due process of law.144  With this, due process is used as a 
vehicle guaranteeing fairness and protection against unreasonable and 
capricious government action.145  When evaluating the restriction of 
employment opportunities, the Court has emphasized that a standard less 
                                                          
 140.  Id. at 388. 
 141.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 142.  Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976); see also Bd. of Regents of State 
Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 588–89 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is also liberty—liberty to 
work—which is the ‘very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity’ secured by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 536 (1922) (“That 
freedom in the making of contracts of personal employment, by which labor and other services are 
exchanged for money or other forms of property, is an elementary part of the rights of personal 
liberty and private property, not to be struck down directly or arbitrarily interfered with . . . .”); 
Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) (“[T]he right to work for a living in the common occupations 
of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the 
purpose of the Amendment to secure.”); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121 (1889) (“It is 
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business, or 
profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like 
age, sex, and condition.  This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of 
our republican institutions.”).  But see De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 157 (1960) (holding that 
New York legislation barring collection from pier superintendents, longshoremen, and hiring agents 
of dues on behalf of a union where any of the officers or agents has a felony conviction did not 
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 143.  Roth, 408 U.S. at 588–89. 
 144.  Willner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102 (1963) (citing Schware v. Bd. 
of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238–39 (1957)). 
 145.  Roth, 408 U.S. at 589; see also Schware, 353 U.S. at 238 (stating that the government is 
prohibited in its regulation of professional employment from foreclosing an array of opportunities 
“in a manner . . . that contravene[s] . . . Due Process.”). 
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than strict scrutiny applies.146  Nevertheless, the government deprivation 
must comport with due process. 
These principles are deeply entrenched in American 
constitutionalism and reached their pinnacle during the infamous 
Lochner era in which the Supreme Court invalidated a number of statutes 
on the premise that such statutes interfered with an individual’s freedom 
of contract,147 asserting in one case that “[t]he right to earn a livelihood 
and to continue in employment unmolested by efforts to enforce void 
enactments should similarly be entitled to protection in the absence of 
adequate remedy.”148  The method employed, substantive due process 
analysis, was soon thereafter repudiated, the death toll ringing with West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish in 1938.149  With the New Deal and the 
“Switch in Time That Saved Nine,” the Court back peddled on the 
existence of a “right” to earn a livelihood in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp.150  Instead of looking into the substance of legislative actions 
regarding occupational freedom and assessing it for fairness, the Court 
gave almost absolute deference to legislative action.151  However, 
substantive due process analysis may still thrive in one specific instance: 
to protect a discrete and insular minority.152  Whether ex-offenders as a 
group would qualify as such—a discrete and insular minority—is a 
question only for the United States Supreme Court. 
B. Collateral Consequences in the Supreme Court 
Historically, the treatment of collateral consequences has been 
inconsistent at best.  Judges and lawyers alike are unsure of whether they 
are criminal or civil, collateral or direct, and whether or not they are 
significant enough to trigger particular constitutional safeguards.  The 
Supreme Court itself passes down mystifying opinions in its review of 
collateral consequences.  It appears as though the Court itself is puzzled 
regarding whether these penalties are direct or collateral and whether 
                                                          
 146.  See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (discussing that a state’s economic 
laws merely need a reasonable basis). 
 147.  Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 176 (1908), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. 
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1905), overruled in part 
by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
 148.  Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 38 (1915). 
 149.  300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (recognizing limits to liberty under the Due Process Clause). 
 150.  301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 151.  See id. at 43–46. 
 152.  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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they are entitled to constitutional review.  In fact, the Court has rarely 
reviewed cases challenging collateral consequences of conviction.  
However, there have been a few instances where the Court granted 
certiorari.  These cases have led to opinions in the context of voting, sex 
offender registration, and deportation. 
1. Collateral Consequences Generally 
In 1974, the Court reviewed a constitutional challenge to felon 
disenfranchisement in Richardson v. Ramirez.153  In that case, the Court 
held that disenfranchisement based on a felony conviction does not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.154  
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reasoned that the text of the 
clause explicitly allowed limitations on voting, asserting that the 
constitutional text itself explicitly calls for disenfranchisement for 
participation “in rebellion, or other crimes.”155  This, however, has not 
foreclosed challenges on other constitutional grounds.156 
In the 2003 case of Connecticut Department of Safety v. Doe,157 the 
Supreme Court considered the collateral consequence of public 
disclosure of state sex offender registrations.  The Court reversed the 
Second Circuit’s ruling that the respondent was deprived of his liberty 
interest in his reputation without procedural due process.158  Drawing on 
precedent, the Court asserted that individuals do not possess a liberty 
interest in reputation alone.159  More importantly, the Court signaled that 
this case had more to do with substantive due process than procedural 
due process, but because the respondent disavowed the substantive 
argument, the Court would not consider the issue.160  This signifies the 
                                                          
 153.  418 U.S. 24 (1974).  
 154.  Id. at 54. 
 155.  Id. at 43 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, cl. 2) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 156.  For example, in Farrakhan v. Gregoire, a three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit ruled that 
Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law violated the statutory requirements of § 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act.  338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003).  The court further found that plaintiffs met their 
summary judgment burden of proving that the discriminatory impact of the disenfranchisement law 
was attributable to racial discrimination in the Washington criminal justice system.  Id. at 1019–20.  
However, after remand, the case returned to the Ninth Circuit, and on rehearing en banc, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed its earlier decision and held that the law does not violate § 2 of the Act.  623 F.3d 
990, 994 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 157. .538 U.S. 1 (2003). 
 158.  Id. at 8. 
 159.   Id. at 6–7 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)). 
 160.  Id. at 8. 
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Court’s willingness to review a substantive due process challenge to 
collateral consequences.161 
In the most recent case on collateral consequences, Padilla v. 
Kentucky, the Court reversed and remanded a judgment of the Kentucky 
Supreme Court rejecting the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim when the defendant’s lawyer failed to advise him of the 
immigration consequences of pleading guilty to a drug trafficking 
offense.162  In rejecting the claim, the Kentucky Supreme Court viewed 
potential deportation as a collateral consequence of conviction and 
therefore outside the scope of the protections of the Sixth Amendment.163  
Reversing, Justice Stevens writing for the majority held that Sixth 
Amendment Strickland requirements necessitate counsel to “inform her 
client of whether his plea carries a risk of deportation”—a consequence 
of a felony conviction.164  While the opinion refused to categorize 
deportation as a direct or collateral consequence, it did recognize the 
confusion over the categorization of direct versus collateral distinction.165 
2. Constitutional Challenges to Occupational Licenses 
The Supreme Court has examined challenges to occupational 
licensing restrictions based on felony conviction in only a few cases.  
The first case that encountered this issue was Hawker v. New York in 
1898.166  There, the Court upheld a statute that criminalized the practice 
of medicine by individuals with a felony conviction.167  The defendant-
doctor was convicted of performing an abortion in contravention of New 
York criminal law and was subsequently barred from practicing 
                                                          
 161.  The Court also reviewed but failed to address the issue of the 2006 Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) as applied to juveniles.  United States v. Juvenile Male, 
130 S. Ct. 2518 (2010) (per curiam).  The United States petitioned for certiorari requesting review of 
the Ninth Circuit’s determination that retroactive application of SORNA to individuals adjudicated 
delinquent prior to its enactment violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.  Id. at 2519.  
The Court found the issue moot as the respondent had reached the age of majority by the time the 
case reached the Court.  Id.  However, the Court did two important things in its per curiam opinion.  
First, it reiterated the notion that collateral consequences are sufficient to satisfy Article III’s injury-
in-fact requirement for standing.  Id.  Second, the Court hinted that a judgment of the Court in this 
matter could remedy the collateral consequence of a conviction.  Id. at 2519–20.  Both of these taken 
together indicate willingness, even if lukewarm, to address issues regarding collateral consequences. 
 162.  130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486–87 (2010). 
 163.  Id. at 1481. 
 164.  Id. at 1486. 
 165.  Id. at 1482. 
 166.  170 U.S. 189 (1898).  
 167.  Id. at 199–200. 
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medicine.168  Dr. Hawker alleged a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause 
of the Constitution.169  The Court reasoned that this prohibition was not 
an additional punishment but was instead a regulation premised on 
evidence of the unfitness of the offender—the evidence being the fact of 
conviction.170 
A little over fifty years later, the Court confronted the issue of 
occupational licensing restrictions again in Barsky v. Board of 
Regents.171  The Court found a New York statute suspending a 
physician’s license upon felony conviction constitutionally 
permissible.172  In that case, the physician-defendant was convicted for 
failing to comply with a congressional subpoena, and his license was 
subsequently revoked per the statute.173  He argued that the statute under 
which he was “convicted” was not a “crime,” thereby failing to provide a 
basis for the suspension of his license.174  Dr. Barsky argued that the 
statute permitting the suspension was unconstitutionally vague and 
therefore a violation of due process.175  The Court distinguished the New 
York statute giving the Board of Regents broad discretion in determining 
whether to revoke a license from those statutes requiring automatic 
termination of a license upon felony conviction.176  For the Court, the 
discretionary nature of the statute coupled with New York’s interest in 
public safety was determinative.177  The statute was therefore 
constitutionally reasonable.178 
In De Veau v. Braisted, the Court upheld a statute that disqualified 
individuals with felony convictions from holding union offices in 
specific waterfront occupations.179  The appellant alleged due process 
violations and unconstitutional ex post facto and bill of attainder 
                                                          
 168.  Id. at 192; Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards A Constitutional 
Framework For Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People With Criminal Records, 7 
J.L. SOC’Y 18, 28 (2005).  For more discussion of the effect of collateral consequences on abortion 
doctors, see Gabriel J. Chin, Are Collateral Sanctions Premised on Conduct or Conviction?: The 
Case of Abortion Doctors, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1685 (2003). 
 169.  Hawker, 170 U.S. at 190–91. 
 170.  Id. at 197. 
 171.  347 U.S. 442 (1954). 
 172.  Id. at 454–55. 
 173.  Id. at 444–45. 
 174.  Id. at 448. 
 175.  Id.  
 176.  Id. at 452. 
 177.  Id. at 456. 
 178.  Id.  
 179.  363 U.S. 144, 153–54, 160 (1960). 
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claims.180  The Court determined that the exclusion of convicted felons 
from holding union offices in this context was constitutionally 
permissible because waterfront commercial enterprises were particularly 
susceptible to corruption.181  The New York state interest in preventing 
such corruption was justifiable, and the means of preventing such 
corruption, barring ex-offenders from holding office, was 
constitutionally permissible.182 
Outside of the Lochner era, the Supreme Court has not dealt with 
occupational licensing restrictions with any real consistency.  It is clear 
that the Court will give substantial deference to legislatures and, many 
times, will find against an ex-offender’s interest in occupational 
freedoms.  However, the Court has developed no real framework to 
evaluate such challenges.  Furthermore, reasoning employed in prior case 
law is no longer applicable in an era when one in four Americans have 
some type of criminal history.  The Supreme Court has not heard an 
occupational licensing challenge to date.  As a result lower courts have 
been forced to develop jurisprudence in this area by parsing through 
older Supreme Court precedent and newer circuit court of appeals case 
law. 
3. Current Constitutional Challenges 
Claims challenging occupational licensing restrictions have been 
customarily brought under equal protection and due process.183  Due 
process has permitted challenges under procedural due process, 
substantive due process, and the irrebuttable presumption doctrine.  The 
question becomes whether the classification is arbitrary and whether 
there is a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest while 
simultaneously giving substantial deference to legislative action.184  
Because ex-offenders are not considered a suspect class, equal protection 
analysis regarding occupational licensing disqualifications is essentially 
the same.185  While it has been argued that ex-offenders ought to be 
                                                          
 180.  Id. at 145. 
 181.  Id. at 149. 
 182.  Id. at 158–59. 
 183.  See, e.g., id. at 145 (challenging occupational licensing on due process grounds). 
 184.  See Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 459, 470 (1954) (discussing arbitrariness and 
rational relationship inquiries of due process analysis in the occupational licensing context). 
 185.  Jacques v. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 15 So. 3d 793, 797 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2009). 
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treated as a suspect class, two main obstacles exist.186  First, ex-offenders 
are themselves responsible for their classification by their individual 
engagement in criminal conduct.187  Thus, the “felon” label is 
preventable.  It is also distinguishable from the immutable characteristics 
of race, sex, and alienage, which are traditionally entitled to a higher 
degree of constitutional scrutiny.188  In addition, the text of the 
Fourteenth Amendment permits the disenfranchisement of felons upon a 
finding of participation in “crimes.”189  These obstacles make it difficult 
for reviewing courts to find constitutionally impermissible discrimination 
on the basis of felony conviction.  Moreover, states have broad authority 
under their police power to protect the health, safety, and morals of their 
citizens.190  Most state statutes disqualifying ex-offenders from 
occupational licenses typically do so with “public safety” or “public 
trust” as the basis for the denial.191  In such instances, the state has a 
weightier interest at stake than the interest of an unprotected class of 
persons. 
Procedural due process claims have also been levied against state 
occupational licensing restrictions.  The Supreme Court has held it is 
constitutionally impermissible for a state to arbitrarily exclude persons 
from an occupation.192  However, it remains unclear whether an 
individual who has been denied a professional license is entitled to a 
hearing if the denial is based on facts that may be adjudicated at a 
hearing.  Some decisions concerning a “property” right in a professional 
license indicate that no hearing is required unless the individual 
previously received a license that the state seeks to revoke.193  Thus, an 
individual denied an initial license would have to sue to have the denial 
                                                          
 186.  Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CAL. L. 
REV. 1191, 1191–92 (2006). 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. at 1206. 
 189.  Id. at 1231 (citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)). 
 190.  DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976). 
 191.  Schanuel v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1983) (promoting public trust in a 
detective agency); Austin v. Ariz. Registrar of Contractors, No. 2 CA-CV 2008-0175, 2009 WL 
638106, at *5–7 (Ariz. App. 2009) (mem.) (protecting public from unscrupulous and unqualified 
contractors); Jacques v. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 15 So. 3d 793, 797 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2009) (operating slot machines in a safe and lawful manner); Jurek v. Ohio Motor Vehicle Dealers 
Bd., 651 N.E.2d 3, 5 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (reducing risk of public exposure to unscrupulous 
business practices). 
 192.  Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238–39 (1957). 
 193.  Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1972) (citing Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). 
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reviewed.  Furthermore, while notice is an essential component of due 
process, the traditional meaning of “fair notice,” where a person of 
ordinary intelligence comprehends that her conduct is prohibited and 
subject to consequences,194 allows significant leeway in the way state 
agencies comport with due process.  Questions remain regarding whether 
a statute that denies ex-felons licenses satisfies the requirement of fair 
notice. 
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine, a hybrid of substantive and 
procedural due process, appeared to offer the most promising challenge 
to occupational licensing restrictions.  In the early 1970s, the Supreme 
Court reviewed five cases regarding statutory classifications.195  The 
Court concluded that the state was constitutionally forbidden from 
establishing an irrebutable presumption where it classified individuals for 
purposes of allocating a burden or benefit without making a 
determination of the individual’s claim.  Therefore, a due process 
violation occurs when a legislatively important fact is presumed from a 
separately proven fact under a process or procedure in which the 
individual involved was denied an opportunity to rebut the 
presumption.196  For example, in Cleveland Board of Education v. 
LaFleur, the Court invalidated employment restrictions on pregnant 
teachers where no procedure was provided to make individualized 
determinations on their ability to work during their pregnancies.197  
While the irrebuttable presumption doctrine does not strictly conform to 
a procedural due process analysis, it does highlight important due 
process concerns.  When the state distributes burdens or benefits, a fair 
procedure is necessary.  Such challenges met with some success but were 
otherwise short-lived.198  The doctrine was criticized for confusing 
                                                          
 194.  United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979). 
 195.  Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644 (1974); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. 
Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 
405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542–43 (1971). 
 196.  Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 582 (S.D. Iowa 1974).  See generally, Note, The 
Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534, 1539–44 (1974) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s irrebuttable presumption doctrine on certain statutory 
classifications). 
 197.  414 U.S. at 644. 
 198.  Kindem v. City of Alameda, 502 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (finding 
unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption in violation of due process by state when ten-year-old 
conviction served as the basis for dismissal); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1978) 
(finding city employment excluding former drug users from public employment violative of due 
process under irrebuttable presumption); Brandt v. Fox, 153 Cal. Rptr. 683, 688–90 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1979) (holding due process violation when Attorney General denied real estate license to individual 
on basis of older drug conviction). 
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traditional constitutional analysis under due process and equal 
protection.199  With Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, the 
due process irrebuttable presumption doctrine was reasoned away and 
put to sleep.200 
Understanding that the customary constitutional protections used to 
evaluate statutes for fairness are virtually inoperable in the context of 
individual occupational rights, this Article looks to a different framework 
that may serve as the mode of analysis.  BMW v. Gore and its progeny 
provide doctrinal underpinnings in the creation of a workable framework. 
IV. BMW GUIDEPOSTS AS DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES 
BMW v. Gore established the constitutional framework currently 
governing substantive due process review of punitive damages awards.  
Prior to BMW, the Court explicitly recognized that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment specifically imposed a substantive 
limit on punitive damages awards.201  However, the Court dealt with such 
issues largely on a procedural level.202  After BMW in 1996, the Court 
began to look into the sum and substance of such judgments.  It was the 
first case in the Court’s history in which it employed a strict application 
of proportionality review, and it protected a multinational, multibillion 
dollar corporation: BMW of North America.203 
A. Fair Notice 
In BMW, the Court evaluated the punitive damages award according 
to two main principles under the Due Process Clause.  First, it assessed 
the judgment with a procedural due process analysis, specifically honing 
in on whether the corporation received fair notice.204  The Court asserted 
that due process dictates that a person not only receive fair notice of “the 
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of 
                                                          
 199.  Note, supra note 196, at 1547. 
 200.  Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). 
 201.  TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 455 (1993) (plurality opinion).  The 
Supreme Court held that the $10 million punitive damages award did not violate due process.  Id. at 
451.  The compensatory award was $19,000.  Id. 
 202.  Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1055 
(2004). 
 203.  BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585–86 (1996). 
 204.  Id. at 574. 
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the penalty that a State may impose.”205  Thus, a person must have notice 
of both the conduct that triggers the penalty as well as the harshness of 
the penalty.  While pointing out that the more stringent constitutional 
protections afforded to criminal defendants are not applicable to civil 
cases generally, the Court asserted that basic due process safeguards can 
be triggered in the context of civil penalties.206  The principle developed 
under BMW established a fair notice test for reviewing civil penalties.  
Lower courts are to consider (1) whether the person received fair notice 
that her conduct will subject her to punishment, and (2) whether she 
received fair notice of the severity of the penalty that a state may impose 
for that conduct. 
B. “Reasonableness” and the BMW Guideposts 
In BMW, the Court also evaluated the reasonableness of the punitive 
damages judgment.  The Court fashioned a three-part test to serve as 
“guideposts” for lower courts when evaluating such awards.  These 
guideposts include evaluating (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct,207 (2) the ratio of punitive damages to the actual and 
potential harm that the plaintiff and other conceivable victims suffered,208 
and (3) an inquiry into how punitive damage awards compare with the 
civil and criminal penalties that had been or could be imposed for 
comparable misconduct.209  These principles form the framework of 
reasonableness review of civil penalties.  The three guideposts, although 
harshly criticized, are both neutral and general and have the ability to 
transcend the outcome of these types of cases as well as apply to a 
different civil penalty context. 
1. Degree of Reprehensibility 
The degree of reprehensibility is an important indicator of 
reasonableness in this framework.210  Within this guidepost lies the well-
established theoretical principle of proportionality: that a punishment 
                                                          
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. at 574 n.22. 
 207.  Id. at 578–80. 
 208.  Id. at 580–83. 
 209.  Id. at 583–86. 
 210.  Douglas G. Harkin, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: A Trial Judge’s Guide to Jury 
Instructions and Judicial Review of Punitive Damage Awards, 60 MONT. L. REV. 367, 381 (1999). 
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issued should fit the crime committed.211  Some acts are more 
blameworthy than others and should be treated accordingly.  In 
measuring the degree of reprehensibility, the Court relied heavily on 
common law jurisprudence and criminal law analogies.212  To 
demonstrate how lower courts should evaluate reprehensibility, the Court 
reiterated certain established principles including that “nonviolent crimes 
are less serious than crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence” 
and specific acts such as “trickery and deceit’ are ‘more reprehensible 
than negligence.”213  The Court also attempted to articulate aggravating 
factors to use to assess the degree of reprehensibility, including whether 
the harm was strictly economic or harmful to the health and safety of 
individuals, and the financial vulnerability of the plaintiff-victim.214  
Clearly, the Court was extracting principles from other contexts and 
using them to analytically strengthen its judgment. 
Punitive damages are different than collateral consequences because 
punitive damages are a creature of tort, contract, and civil law while 
collateral consequences are the result of criminal conduct and criminal 
law.  However, constitutional jurisprudence in this country has mixed the 
two areas throughout history.  For example, forfeiture is governed by 
civil law and is a civil process but can be initiated (and often is) as the 
result of criminal conduct.215  In BMW, the Court cites numerous 
criminal cases in support of the ratio it advanced under the second 
guidepost, including Williams v. New York,216Miller v. Florida,217 and 
Lankford v. Idaho.218 
2. Ratio–Proportionality Review 
The second guidepost, the ratio of punitive damages to the actual and 
potential harm, is the most criticized of the three.  It is also the guidepost 
that has been most modified by subsequent cases.  In BMW, the Court 
hesitated to create a bright-line ratio of compensatory damages to 
                                                          
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id.  
 213.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 576 (quoting Salem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292–93 (1983); TXO Prod. 
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  See supra Part II.B (discussing civil forfeiture statutes triggered by past criminal conduct). 
 216.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 573 n.19 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)). 
 217.  Id. at 574 n.22 (citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987)). 
 218.  Id. (citing Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991)). 
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punitive damages.219  The Court asserted that a 500:1 ratio “rais[ed] a 
suspicious judicial eyebrow” and was beyond an appropriate range of 
acceptable punitive awards.220  However, the standard began to evolve 
with the Court’s judgment in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. v. Campbell.221  In State Farm, the Court found a $145 million 
punitive damage award against State Farm for a bad faith failure to settle 
an insurance claim within policy limits grossly excessive and violative of 
substantive due process.222  The trial court reduced the judgment to $25 
million.223  Applying BMW’s three guideposts, the Utah Supreme Court 
reinstated the jury’s original punitive damages award.224  Granting 
certiorari, the Supreme Court invalidated the punitive damages award 
against the insurance giant as excessive under due process.225  For the 
Court, a 145:1 ratio was excessive, whereas 1:1 or 4:1 would satisfy due 
process.226  Five years later in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,227 the Court 
not only reiterated the principle that excessive punitive damages awards 
violate due process, but also that a 1:1 compensatory-to-punitive 
damages ratio is the rule in federal maritime cases.228  According to the 
majority, such a ratio protects against unpredictable and arbitrary awards 
issued for strictly retributive purposes.229  In essence, Exxon stands for 
the proposition that the ratio between compensatory and punitive 
damages is constitutional only if they are equal.230  This reaches the 
“outermost limit of the due process guarantee.”231 
Today it is quite clear that large punitive damage awards with a 
small compensatory damage counterpart will no longer be 
constitutionally permissible.  The Court not only applied strict 
                                                          
 219.  Id. at 582. 
 220.  Id. at 583 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481 (1993) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 221.  538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 222.  Id. at 413–14, 429. 
 223.  Id. at 415.  The jury awarded the plaintiffs $2.6 million in compensatory damages.  Id.  The 
trial court also reduced the compensatory judgment to $1 million.  Id.  
 224.  Id. at 415. 
 225.  Id. at 429. 
 226.  Id. at 425–26. 
 227.  554 U.S. 472 (2008). 
 228.  Id. at 512–13. 
 229.  Id.  
 230.  Id. at 501. 
 231.  Id. (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425).  However, the Court left a door open in cases 
where the compensatory judgment is small but the defendant’s conduct is so reprehensible as to 
allow for a larger punitive damages award.  See id. 
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proportionality for the first time, but it also crafted a principle that 
required strict proportionality review in the constitutional evaluation of 
civil penalties.  Now, civil penalties will be found excessive if the actual 
and potential harm to plaintiffs were minimal and the civil penalty 
massive. 
3. Comparative Prong 
The third guidepost assesses sanctions for comparable misconduct.  
In essence, the Court compares the punitive damages judgment against 
the criminal or civil sanctions that may have been imposed for similar 
misconduct in that particular jurisdiction.232  Within this guidepost lies 
substantial legislative deference regarding suitable sanctions for conduct 
at issue in both the civil and criminal contexts.233  In its analysis the 
Court also compared civil penalties levied against wrongdoers in other 
jurisdictions.234  The statute at issue in BMW was a provision from the 
Alabama Deceptive Trade Practice Act.235  The Court looked at other 
states’ statutes including New York’s.236  This permits flexibility in 
evaluating the fairness of a given state’s statutory approach on a 
particular civil penalty. 
4. Summary 
The Court ultimately found that BMW did not have adequate notice 
that it could be exposed to such a large judgment.237  For the Court, the 
fact that BMW is a “large corporation rather than an impecunious 
individual” was of no legal consequence.238  Nor was the statute’s 
existence of relevant import.  Instead, without a substantial history of 
noncompliance and with the national economic interest favoring trade-
friendly statutes, the Alabama judgment was determined excessive and 
therefore violative of due process.239 
A number of important matters arise from this new line of case law.  
First, it appears the Court is resurrecting substantive due process as a 
                                                          
 232.  BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996). 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Id. at 584. 
 235.  Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 8-19-11 (1993)).
 236.  Id. (citing N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396 (McKinney Supp. 1995)). 
 237.  Id. at 586. 
 238.  Id. at 585. 
 239.  Id. at 585–86. 
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means of analysis for civil penalties.  Unequivocally, the court looked 
into the sum and substance of the statutory schema and the facts 
surrounding the issue.  This is quite different from the legislative 
deference the Court has traditionally given in due process challenges, 
especially when evaluating judgments affecting economic freedoms.240 
Of course, the composition of the Court has changed substantially 
since BMW.  Three of the five Justices in the majority left the Court, 
including Justices Souter, O’Connor, and Stevens, leaving many on the 
Court in the dissent.241  Justice Scalia’s dissent primarily rested on the 
lack of a “principled” decision.242  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent discussed 
the Court’s vague application of substantive due process as the “raised 
eyebrow test.”243  The most recent punitive damages case, Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, produced an even split among the Justices 
including a concurrence by Justice Scalia agreeing with the application 
of precedent but disagreeing with the underlying holding.244  Because of 
the uncertainty in the future of this approach with the current 
composition of the Court, it is important to think of this decision’s 
application in a different civil penalties context in order to adhere to stare 
decisis. 
Finally and most importantly, the Court developed a set of neutral 
and general principles that can be used to assess the fairness of civil 
penalties broadly.  Although not frequently referenced outside of the 
context of punitive damages, the Court has referenced the opinion in 
BMW in one other setting.  To date, the Court has applied the principles 
in the context of criminal sentencing.245  Although not directly on point, 
this demonstrates the potential applicability of the framework.  
Moreover, the Court utilized much criminal punishment case law to 
shape its guideposts in BMW.246  Before applying this framework to 
                                                          
 240.  Jeffrey M. Shaman, On the 100th Anniversary of Lochner v. New York, 72 TENN. L. REV. 
455, 492 (2005); see also supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text. 
 241.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 561. 
 242.  Id. at 598–99 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 
538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 243.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 244.  554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 245.  United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 152 (1997) (citing BMW for the principle that a 
sentencing judge may consider all information concerning the defendant’s characteristics and 
offenses). 
 246.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 574 n.22, 575–76 (citing Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991); Miller 
v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 211 (1983)). 
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occupational licensing restrictions, it is important to note the limitations 
and critique of these principles. 
5. Critique and Limitations 
The recent punitive damages line of cases has been the subject of 
extreme criticism.  The critique takes two forms: legal and normative.  
With the more general legal critique, scholars look at the legal effects 
and implications of the Supreme Court decisions and offer suggestions 
for reform.  The normative critiques, however, compare the protections 
advanced by the Court for big business and wealthy corporations in the 
punitive damages setting with the minimal safeguards offered to 
individuals in the criminal punishment context. 
a. General Critique 
The primary general critique rests on the premise that the Court has 
failed to develop a doctrine that provides actual guidance to lower courts 
in their assessment of the reasonableness of punitive damages 
judgments.247  The guideposts themselves are described as 
“contradictory” and “point in no particular direction.”248  Creative lower 
courts can easily distinguish the punitive damages line of cases from 
whatever case they are deciding.249  Scholars base their opinions on the 
notion that the first two guideposts are inherently subjective and 
dependent on the norms of the assessor, versus objective factors that are 
evaluated independently without the assessor’s biases and opinions.250 
An additional critique of the case law is that in this context the 
Supreme Court has become a conservative activist Court, advancing tort 
reform through its majority decision.251  Instead of deferring to 
legislative judgment, “the Court has itself chosen to craft a new 
jurisprudence of excessiveness to achieve” the end it desired.252  Simply 
                                                          
 247.  Keith N. Hylton, Due Process and Punitive Damages: An Economic Approach, 2 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 345, 347 (2008). 
 248.  Doug Rendleman, Common Law Punitive Damages: Something for Everyone?, 7 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 1, 13 (2009). 
 249.  Id.  
 250.  A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error of Federal 
Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1085, 1096–98 (2006). 
 251.  See Rendleman, supra note 248, at 13–14 (explaining that in previous cases the 
conservative Justices were divided on tort reform until Justices Alito and Roberts allied with the 
majority to find a substantive due process limit in punitive damage judgments). 
 252.  Spencer, supra note 250, at 1090.  
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put, the Court distorted and misused prior precedent to support and 
legitimize a doctrine that it completely made up.253 
Finally, a criticism is levied against the majority opinion as removing 
the original purpose behind punitive damages, namely retribution and 
deterrence, from the equation.  If deterrence is achieved by the issuance 
of punitive damages, it is because of the economic loss suffered as a 
result of the defendant’s wrongdoing.254  Multibillion-dollar companies 
will not be affected by a judgment that does not hurt their pocketbook.  
Instead, businesses will begin to include punitive damages in their risk 
assessments across the board.  This effectively reduces risk prevention in 
the corporate environment.  Punishment itself requires the establishment 
of an upper limit by a legislative body thereby reflecting society’s 
judgment of the wrongful conduct and the type of punishment to subject 
a wrongdoer to.255 
b. Normative 
By limiting punitive damages based on the compensatory award as 
opposed to using the defendant’s resources as a tool in assessing an 
adequate punishment, the Court permits big business and “wealthy 
corporations to use the Constitution as a shield to protect them from 
juries’ full expressions of moral outrage.”256  Moreover, the Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area leads many to question the overall 
interpretation of substantive due process in the new millennium.  One 
must normatively consider who and what the Constitution protects.  
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky identifies what he terms a “cruel irony.”257  
“The principle that emerges is that too many years in prison for 
shoplifting does not violate the Constitution but too much money in 
punitive damages against a business for ‘manslaughter’ is 
unconstitutional.”258 
In recent punitive damages cases including BMW and State Farm, 
the Court focused on the ratio between compensatory and punitive 
                                                          
 253.  Id. at 1088. 
 254.  Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: 
A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 135 (1982). 
 255.  Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality: The 
Importance of Legislative Limits, 41 CONN. L. REV. 109, 115 (2008). 
 256.  Patrick H. Foley, Oil and Water: How the Polluted Wake of the Exxon Valdez has 
Endangered the Essence of Punitive Damages, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 475, 494 (2010). 
 257.  Chemerinsky, supra note 202, at 1051. 
 258.  Id. 
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damages.259  The Eighth Amendment jurisprudential analysis pays no 
attention to the ratio between the state recidivist enhancement and the 
original punishment for the underlying criminal offense.260  
Proportionality review for actual individuals is virtually nonexistent in 
noncapital cases,261 while strict proportionality review is applied to 
evaluate fairness for big business. 
Another normative critique is based on the fact that the Court 
reviews punitive damages awards de novo.262  The reasoning advanced 
by the Court for de novo review of a punitive damages award is that it is 
essentially a question of law and not fact.263  However, when the Court 
analyzes criminal punishment, it tends to give significant deference to 
state legislatures.264  While big business and wealthy corporations have 
political capital at all levels of government, prisoners and ex-offenders 
have virtually no political power.265  Thus, it would seem logical to give 
equal or greater constitutional protection through application of stricter 
scrutiny to policies that affect individuals compared to those that affect 
big business, unless fairness is a right now enjoyed only by wealthy 
corporations in American jurisprudence. 
V. THE CHALLENGE 
A. Substantive Due Process Analysis 
In light of the principles and framework crafted in BMW, many 
occupational licensing restrictions should be found violative of due 
process and therefore invalid.  This is not to say that in all situations 
occupational licensing restrictions will be found unconstitutional.  But in 
the context of an offender who pleads guilty to a low-level, nonviolent 
crime, it appears elementary that in most circumstances a reviewing 
court will find not only a fair-notice violation but also that the civil 
penalty is unreasonable and grossly excessive. 
                                                          
 259.  Id. at 1063. 
 260.  Id. at 1051. 
 261.  See Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional 
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1188 (2009) (discussing how 
noncapital defendants receive almost none of the benefits that capital defendants receive). 
 262.  Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001). 
 263.   Id. at 437. 
 264.  See Chemerinsky, supra note 202, at 1058–62 (noting that the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
review of noncapital cases rarely results in a finding that state punishment is unconstitutional). 
 265.  Id. at 1071. 
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1. Fair Notice 
Regarding notice, it is reasonable to say that many offenders 
pleading guilty to offenses do not receive adequate notice that their 
criminal conduct will trigger a variety of civil penalties.  Using the 
principles established in BMW to evaluate fair notice, ex-offenders do 
not have notice that their underlying criminal conduct will set in motion 
specific occupational licensing restrictions and that the severity of the 
restrictions are manifested in indeterminate eligibility, potential lifetime 
ban, and exclusion from a major economic sector of society. 
As mentioned earlier, there are over 38,000 civil consequences of 
conviction nationwide, averaging 700 per jurisdiction.266  Approximately 
65% of these penalties are employment related.267  These consequences 
of conviction are civil penalties that attach by virtue of a felony 
conviction.268  Although not frequently visited as a constitutional issue 
for the Supreme Court, the existing legal treatment of these penalties is 
semantic.  It appears from current legal doctrine that the nomenclature of 
“collateral consequences” puts these penalties outside of the 
constitutional reach of plea colloquies and, in many instances, the advice 
given by defense counsel in a criminal case.269  Although a plea of guilty 
must be at least voluntary and knowing to satisfy guaranteed protections 
under due process,270 collateral consequences of a conviction are 
typically not a penalty criminal defendants are constitutionally required 
to receive notice of through counsel or the trial court during a plea.271  
Given this, most ex-offenders will not receive fair notice of collateral 
consequences due to the sheer volume of statutes and regulations 
disqualifying this group from obtaining licenses and employment 
opportunities.  Furthermore, this particular demographic is 
undereducated, overcriminalized, and the most politically vulnerable 
group in American society today. 
                                                          
 266.  Gowen, supra note 34. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  Chin, supra note 36, at 253. 
 269.  Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 
670, 678–80 (2008).   
 270.  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 n.4 (1970). 
 271.  Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 726 (2002). 
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2. Three Guideposts 
Under the BMW framework, cases concerning occupational licensing 
restrictions based on nonviolent convictions may be challenged 
successfully.  Evaluating the first guidepost, a trial court would 
determine the degree of criminal reprehensibility or blameworthiness 
underlying the defendant’s conduct.272  Here, the more dangerous and 
frequent the defendant’s conduct, the more liability society will assume.  
In BMW, the Court quoted proportionality language from the Eighth 
Amendment Supreme Court case of Solem v. Helm, “non-violent crimes 
are less serious than crimes marked by violence or the threat of 
violence.”273  This quotation is important for two reasons: (1) it goes 
directly to the heart of the issue in this guidepost, namely that nonviolent 
crimes are less severe than violent crimes and should therefore be 
analyzed as less reprehensible, and (2) it freely utilizes dicta from the 
punishment cases to evaluate the fairness of punitive damages, which 
essentially formulated a neutral principle—a hybrid opinion composed of 
civil and criminal Supreme Court precedent.  It created a flexible premise 
applicable in a number of constitutional questions.  The Court also 
asserted that economic harm is less reprehensible than “indifference to or 
reckless disregard for the health and safety of others.”274  With this, it 
follows that economic harm is not equivalent to harms that are violent 
and reckless or that disregard the health and safety of others. 
Assessing the second guidepost,275 the ratio of the severity of the 
consequences on the individual to the actual and potential harm on 
victims and potential victims, requires proportionality review.  This 
notion is easily translated.  In the case of nonviolent offenders, the harm 
stemming from statutory and regulatory exclusions on the ex-offender 
may outweigh the actual and potential harm on victims and potential 
victims.  As a general matter, many nonviolent offenses are considered 
victimless crimes and so harm to victims would be low.276  Of course, 
                                                          
 272.  BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–80 (1996); see also supra Part IV.B.1. 
 273.  BMW. 517 U.S. at 576 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292–93 (1983)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 274.  Id. 
 275.  Id. at 580–83; see also supra Part IV.B.2. 
 276.  Although I do recognize that drug offenses have potential victims, and the amount of drugs 
could have numerous harms associated with potential victims, I do not subscribe to that argument 
because use of controlled substances is a free-will choice in the first instance.  Moreover, American 
criminal law does not recognize a duty of care for the health and safety of unrelated friends, 
extended family, or strangers.  
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there are those extreme cases where a nonviolent crime causes 
substantial economic harm to a real victim, such as in Ponzi schemes and 
identity theft.  For purposes of this thesis, however, the focus is on run-
of-the-mill, low-level, nonviolent drug offenses.  Utilizing the 
constitutionally tolerated ratios set forth by the Court in State Farm and 
Exxon, a nonviolent felony conviction that triggers a lifetime 
occupational licensing restriction would be constitutionally 
impermissible.  A durational requirement prior to being considered 
eligible for a license may be allowed.  However, the duration ought not 
exceed single-digit ratios because the Court may find such government 
action grossly excessive. 
Finally, the third BMW factor, the way in which the punitive 
damages award compares with criminal or civil penalties that have been 
or could be imposed for comparable misconduct,277 allows for great 
flexibility.  Comparisons could be made with the same jurisdiction, 
different American jurisdictions, and foreign jurisdictions on the issue.  
Collateral consequences vary across state lines as states administer them 
differently, apply different time limits, and have a different 
administrative protocol for the restoration of rights.  Cross-nationally 
comparing occupational licensing statutes would benefit any claim. 
a. A Hypothetical—Wisconsin and Private Security Guards 
To better illustrate how a challenge to an automatic license 
disqualification would be levied and possibly analyzed, take the 
following hypothetical based on the Wisconsin private detective, 
investigator, and security personnel statute.  This section discusses the 
arguments that could be made by challengers as well as those that the 
state would likely put forth were a challenge brought.  The statute states, 
“An individual who has been convicted in this state or elsewhere of a 
felony and who has not been pardoned for that felony is not eligible for a 
license under this section.”278  The statute also prohibits individuals 
convicted of unpardoned felonies from working for a private detective 
agency that does business in Wisconsin as a supplier of private security 
guards in a variety of different contexts including patrolling businesses, 
stadiums, hospitals, colleges, and similar activities.279 
                                                          
 277.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 583–85; see also supra Part IV.B.3. 
 278.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 440.26(2)(c)2 (West 2012). 
 279.  Id. § 440.26(5)(c), (5m)2. 
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I chose this statute for a number of reasons.  First, the statute in its 
current form has been in existence since 1996.280  Prior to that, the statute 
included a five-year waiting period for those convicted of a felony to 
become eligible for the license.281  This demonstrates the way the 
legislature intentionally excluded unpardoned ex-offenders from this 
occupation for a lifetime rather than a period of time.  It is also important 
that this statute is automatic upon conviction.  There is no first-offender 
exception to the rule.  In other words, once a felony conviction is 
announced and recorded, an individual is automatically ineligible for this 
license unless pardoned by the governor.  In Wisconsin, there have been 
a total of fifty-two pardons since 2001, excluding the eighty-five pardons 
granted by Governor Doyle in 2010 after announcing he would not run 
for reelection.282  In addition, this statute is the classic blanket prohibition 
against felony offenders, meaning that there is no distinction between 
classifications of crimes in determining eligibility.  An individual 
convicted of robbery is treated the same as an individual convicted of 
possession of a narcotic.  Moreover, the statute and accompanying 
regulations fail to mention any right to judicial review upon agency 
denial.283  There is also no provision in the statute calling for review by 
an administrative law judge.284  Instead, eligibility decisions are within 
the exclusive discretion of the department.285  The statute also does not 
require any relationship between the crime of conviction and the job 
duties of a security guard or private detective.286  The actual occupation 
of private security guard is critical to the analysis because these jobs 
form a major employment sector in the national and local economies, and 
are expected to grow.287  I chose this statute due to the prevalence of jobs 
available in this sector of the economy and the range of employment 
                                                          
 280.   See S.B. 597, 1995–96 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 19 (Wis. 1996) (amending language in WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 440.26(2)(c)). 
 281.  See id.  
 282.  Donald Leo Bach, To Forgive, Divine: The Governor’s Pardoning Power, WIS. LAW., Feb. 
2005, available at http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Current_Issue1&TEMPLATE 
=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=39460 (compiling data from Wisconsin Secretary of 
State and reports filed to state senate from 1979–2004). 
 283.  See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 440.26 (2)(c). 
 284.  See id.  The administrative law judge is an attorney designated by the department general 
counsel.  WIS. ADMIN. CODE SPS § 1-08(2) (2012). 
 285.  See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 440.26. 
 286.  Id. § 440.26(2)(c)2. 
 287.  See Security Guard Employment Before and After 2001, ISSUES LABOR STATS, Aug. 2007, 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ils/pdf/opbils6l.pdf (showing a trend of increase in security guard 
employment from 2000–2006). 
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opportunities this license covers.  Employment in this industry 
skyrocketed after September 11th,288 and in Wisconsin specifically it is 
projected that this sector will continue to grow despite the recession.289 
In this hypothetical, the challenger is a male convicted of simple 
possession of oxycodone.  In Wisconsin, an individual pleading guilty 
for first time simple possession of oxycodone is guilty of a Class I 
felony.290  An individual convicted of a Class I felony is exposed to “a 
fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 3 years and 6 
months, or both.”291  It is the lowest level felony in the Wisconsin 
criminal classification system.292  For purposes of this hypothetical the 
challenger is a first-offender with no prior arrests who received a 
sentence of six months in prison plus $250 in fines.  The sentence was 
completed five years ago.293 
After applying and being denied a license without a hearing, the 
individual files a claim in state court (or federal) against the 
Commissioner of the Department of Regulation and Licensing 
challenging the denial of the license.  The primary allegation in the 
complaint asserts a due process violation insofar as he was denied fair 
notice.  More specifically, the petitioner argues that he is being denied a 
liberty interest in the opportunity and ability to engage in a common 
occupation without constitutionally sufficient notice of the exposure to 
penalties and the severity of those penalties.  The complaint further 
alleges that the department’s licensing requirement is grossly 
disproportionate and excessive in relation to the underlying criminal 
offense.  A complaint should also include allegations of a violation of 
any codified employment discrimination statutes.  In the case at bar, the 
challenger need not include an allegation of a violation of section 
111.31(1)–(3) of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA)294 
prohibiting discrimination against an individual with a felony conviction.  
This is because WFEA contains an exception to the rule in section 
                                                          
 288.  Id. 
 289.  STATE OF WIS. DEP’T OF WORKFORCE DEV., OFFICE OF ECON. ADVISORS, 2008–2018 
OCCUPATIONAL PROJECTIONS, http://dwd.wisconsin.gov/oea/employment_projections/Wisconsin/lt_ 
occ_detail.xls (last visited Oct. 10, 2012). 
 290.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 961.41(3g)(am). 
 291.  Id. § 939.50(3)(i). 
 292.  Id. 
 293.  The five-year mark is significant as the older version of the statute permitted licensing of 
felons as long as their conviction was five years old.  S.B. 597, 1995–96 Leg. Reg. Sess. § 19 (Wis. 
1996). 
 294.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.31(1)–(3) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011). 
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111.31, which directly states that WFEA is inapplicable to claims of 
discrimination in the licensing of private security persons.295 
Generally, the complaint must also assert important facts and 
supporting information.  The pleadings must include the conviction, the 
circumstances surrounding the conviction, the sentence issued, and the 
duration of time that has elapsed since the sentence was completed.  
These facts are necessary to show the nature and gravity of the offense so 
as to demonstrate the lack of a relationship between the underlying 
criminal conduct and the excessiveness of the statute.  Such facts may 
also demonstrate the likelihood of reoffending.  The claim must also 
include information regarding the number of jobs available to the holder 
of a private security guard license in the national and state economies 
and the expected growth of these jobs to establish the magnitude of the 
lifetime loss of opportunity. 
The analysis begins by evaluating the “degree of reprehensibility of 
the defendant’s conduct.”296  This assessment is subjective.  However, 
BMW gives a reviewing court some guidance.  First, the Court in BMW 
stressed the principle “that punishment should fit the crime”297 and that 
penalties issued should “reflect the enormity of his offense.”298  Thus, on 
the scale of blameworthiness simple possession of a Schedule II narcotic 
is marginally reprehensible because the harm caused is (a) theoretical 
and (b) without a victim.  This is reflected by the classification of the 
crime as a Class I felony.  The first guidepost also considers whether the 
defendant is a recidivist.  In this hypothetical the challenger is not a 
recidivist, making him still only minimally blameworthy.  If he were a 
recidivist with similar nonviolent offenses, the number of convictions 
would become relevant to his degree of reprehensibility.  The result of 
the evaluation of the first guidepost demonstrates that the defendant’s 
conduct is minimally reprehensible. 
Next, the Court assesses the ratio of the severity of the consequences 
on the individual versus the actual and potential harm on victims and 
potential victims.299  The second guidepost encompasses a strict 
proportionality assessment.300  The severity of the statute, namely barring 
                                                          
 295.   Id. § 111.335(1)(cg)1. 
 296.   BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996); see also supra Part IV.B.1. 
 297.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 575 n.24. 
 298.  Id. at 575 (citing Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851)). 
 299.  Id. at 580–82; see also supra Part IV.B.2. 
 300.  See supra Part IV.B.2 (analyzing the progression of the second guidepost towards a strict 
proportionality rule). 
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an entire class of people from the opportunity to engage in a common 
occupation such as a private security guard for an indefinite duration, is 
quite severe.  This type of license is necessary for a number of jobs in the 
national economy including private security guards employed by a 
number of state agencies, different private contracting agencies, retail 
and department stores, parking lots, and the like.  The individual’s 
offense, possession of an illegal substance, is minimal.  The crime itself 
does not have a human victim or potential human victim.  The only 
victim is society, which suffers on a theoretical level from the offender’s 
breach of the criminal law in that specific jurisdiction.  In assessing the 
challenger’s criminal sentence and employment sanctions, it is obvious 
that the ratio exceeds double digits.  Strictly, the criminal sentence lasted 
six months and the Wisconsin statute requires a lifetime ban.  This ratio 
clearly exceeds the double-digit threshold, obviously beyond the 
“outermost limits of the due process guarantee.”301  When reminded of 
the degree of reprehensibility of the challenger, the irrationality of the 
statute crystallizes. 
Finally, the third factor, how the punitive damages award compares 
with criminal or civil penalties that have been or could be imposed for 
comparable misconduct, allows for cross-jurisdictional analysis.302  
Comparing the criminal sanctions the individual would receive is an 
exercise in futility because he already received the criminal penalty 
permitted by statute in that jurisdiction.  The individual is challenging the 
civil disqualification stemming from his conviction, thus, a fair 
comparison would be with different state licensing requirements for the 
same license.  In comparing a neighboring state’s statutory requirements, 
Illinois allows for some leeway.  In Illinois, a felony conviction is not an 
absolute bar to acquiring the license, and completed sentences over ten 
years old are not considered in the determination.303  In Connecticut, 
when an individual is denied a private detective or security guard license 
based on a felony conviction, he is statutorily permitted to appeal the 
issue to the Commissioner.304  The comparison could extend across the 
fifty states to demonstrate the severity of the Wisconsin statutory 
licensing requirement.  From this analysis it appears the licensing law is 
excessive. 
                                                          
 301.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). 
 302.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 583–85; see also supra Part IV.B.3. 
 303.  225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 447 / 25-10(2)–(3) (West 2007). 
 304.  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-154a(d) (West 2010) (private detective); id. § 29-161h(d) 
(West 2011) (security guard). 
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While the BMW framework has been criticized both legally and 
normatively, it does promote a higher level of scrutiny that may be 
applied in other contexts.  After assessing the Wisconsin statute in light 
of a nonviolent, minimally reprehensible offense, it becomes apparent 
that the statute may be vague, too burdensome, overinclusive, and clearly 
excessive in many cases.  In this vein, it is important that courts ensure 
evenhandedness in penalties levied by states for punishable criminal 
conduct.  At the very least, courts ought to invoke principles of 
proportionality to maintain a fair and ordered system of justice. 
3. State Arguments 
The state likely would argue that it has a legitimate interest in 
preventing criminals from engaging in occupations affecting public 
welfare and safety.  In essence, the state would argue for a presumption 
that convicted felons are untrustworthy, unlikely to rehabilitate, and lack 
good character.  The state’s argument would most likely fail for 
numerous reasons. 
First, while it is true that the state has a duty to protect its citizens 
from those who endanger the public safety and welfare in the context of 
employment, it does not have a legislative mandate to enact blanket 
disqualifications on an entire class of persons without at least a 
reasonable relation to the interest the state desires to protect.305  This is 
equal protection and due process 101.  Activities associated with a 
private security guard include patrolling premises to maintain order, 
ensuring compliance with applicable rules and regulations, warning and 
ejecting troublemakers, guarding against theft, and assisting 
management.306  It begs the question, what is the relationship between 
these activities and possession of two Percocet pills?  Again, our 
challenger was not convicted of manufacture, distribution, or sale, nor 
was he convicted of DUI or anything similar.  It is difficult to find a 
relationship between possession and activities associated with the 
license. 
Second, the state makes no distinction in the nature and degree of 
felony convictions.307  For the state, an individual convicted of murder in 
                                                          
 305.  Richard B. Saphine, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne 
Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 597 (2000). 
 306.  Guard, Security, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES, http://www.occupationalinfo.org 
/37/372667034.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
 307.  See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.335(1)(g) (West 2012); see also supra note 293 and 
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the first degree faces the same disqualification as the individual 
convicted of possessing one and one-half ounces of marijuana or even 
two Percocet pills.  The two classes of crime are treated the same.  This 
is so even though the state has enacted different criminal penalties for the 
two crimes, and the defendant convicted of murder or robbery causes 
more harm to society and is thus more criminally culpable.  Moreover, an 
across-the-board exclusion fails to account for individual characteristics 
such as age, subsequent employment, and educational experience, which 
are factors that have been statistically shown to reduce criminal 
recidivism.308 
Finally, the irrationality of the statute is crystallized when compared 
to the licensure requirements to practice medicine or law, which are 
professions with greater connections to the public welfare and safety.  In 
many jurisdictions a felony conviction is not an absolute bar to the 
practice of law, and there is no bar to the practice of medicine in 
Wisconsin based strictly on a felony conviction.309 
VI. COUNTERARGUMENTS 
While this approach is a workable solution, it is far from perfect.  
Three important counterarguments may be addressed up front.  The first 
is a separation of powers argument asserting that such decisions 
regarding state licensing ought to be left to the state legislatures.  The 
second argument asserts that the Eighth Amendment may be better suited 
for this type of challenge.  The final criticism argues that the 
constitutional claim ought to be a Sixth Amendment ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. 
A. Separation of Powers 
One could argue that this issue is better suited for the legislature as it 
is this branch of government that reflects the will of the people and 
contemplates reforming licensing in its individual state.  This argument 
brings to the fore issues of separation of powers.  Under this argument, 
                                                                                                                       
 
accompanying text. 
 308.   Silva, supra note 52, at 162–63. 
 309.   See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 448.05 (referencing section 111.335(c)(1) requiring that the 
disqualifying felony “substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed 
activity”). 
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the approach advocated in this Article would promote unwarranted 
judicial activism.  While there is merit in this argument, it is important to 
remember that the judiciary serves as a check on the other two branches 
of government, as was intended under separation of powers.  
Understanding that the legislature is the proper place for legislative 
reform, the judiciary is still responsible for ensuring that individual 
interests and rights are afforded requisite constitutional protections.310  It 
is within the province of the judiciary to make certain that arbitrary, 
capricious, and unreasonable government conduct is checked, and the 
life, liberty, and property of individuals are afforded the appropriate 
degree of due process.  Deference to the legislature is not always the 
correct judicial response.  The Court has taken the liberty to invalidate 
punitive damage awards issued by juries against corporate entities311 and 
state laws failing to provide sufficient judicial review of punitive 
damages.312  Will the Court offer the same protection to individuals faced 
with the deprivation of their ability to work, go to school, or engage in 
civic life?  This is a normative consideration that will have to be 
addressed by the courts or the people. 
As a general matter, felons lack both political and social capital.  
Felon disenfranchisement is the subject of numerous scholarly articles as 
well as quantitative and qualitative studies.  According to stigma theory, 
ex-offenders are denied the right to vote because they are deemed 
“morally incompetent, unredeemable, and likely to recidivate.”313  
Originating from European Enlightenment thinkers such as Hobbes and 
Rousseau, “civil death” required convicts be to be treated as “lawful 
enem[ies] of the commonwealth”314 and separated from the citizenry for 
violating the social compact.315  In America, reasons for precluding 
felons from voting include preserving the “purity of the ballot box,” 
                                                          
 310.  See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1260 (1982) (discussing one theory of the role of the judiciary). 
 311.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 514 (2008); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003); BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996); see 
also Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 357–58 (2007) (choosing to not decide issue of 
whether punitive damages were excessive because its decision to remand the case to the Oregon 
Supreme Court to better apply its guideposts could result in a new trial and new punitive damage 
award). 
 312.   Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 434 (1994). 
 313.  Afi S. Johnson-Parris, Note, Felon Disenfranchisement: The Unconscionable Social 
Contract Breached, 89 VA. L. REV. 109, 123 (2003). 
 314.  See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 248–49 (1651).  
 315.  JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 31–32 (Charles Frankel ed., Hafner 
Publ’g Co. 1947) (1762).  
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weakening law enforcement institutions, and protection of the welfare of 
communities.316 
Professors Uggen and Manza estimate that 5.3 million adults were 
legally disenfranchised by virtue of conviction in 2000.317  Three-fourths 
of this population were either under community supervision or had 
completed their sentence, yet they were still disenfranchised by state 
statute.318  Professors Uggen and Manza conclude that 
disenfranchisement has affected “seven U.S. Senate races from 1970 to 
1998,” particularly in states with a close election and a number of 
disenfranchised persons in their jurisdiction.319  At last count, 2% of the 
general population and 13% of black males were disenfranchised as a 
result of criminal conviction.320 
Statutory prohibitions on voting reduce turnout in many 
communities, especially minority communities.321  In this respect, 
democratic decision-making with regard to policies adversely affecting 
ex-offenders is impaired: “The exclusion of ex-offenders from full 
participation in political life affects the quality of the decision-making 
with regard to such issues by community residents themselves.”322  
Justice Thurgood Marshall recognized the importance and value of the 
inclusion of ex-offenders in the political process as he asserted, 
[Ex-offenders] are as much affected by the actions of government as 
any other citizens, and have as much of a right to participate in 
governmental decision-making.  Furthermore, the denial of the right to 
vote to such persons is a hindrance to the efforts of society to 
rehabilitate former felons and convert them into law-abiding and 
productive citizens.323 
                                                          
 316.  Marc Mauer, Mass Imprisonment and The Disappearing Voters, in INVISIBLE 
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 50, 54 (Marc Mauer & 
Mesa Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (citing Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 585 (1884)). 
 317.  Christopher Uggen et al., Citizenship, Democracy, and the Civic Reintegration of Criminal 
Offenders, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 281, 287 tbl.1 (2006).  
 318.  Id.  
 319.  Mauer, supra note 316, at 53 (citing Uggen et al., supra note 317). 
 320.  Id. at 51. 
 321.  Aman McLeod et al., The Locked Ballot Box: The Impact of State Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Laws on African American Voting Behavior and Implications for Reform, 11 
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 66, 80 (2003).  Moreover, the likelihood of voting declines at a greater rate 
for blacks overall compared to whites in states with restrictive disenfranchisement laws.  Id. 
 322.  Regina Austin, “The Shame of It All”: Stigma and the Political Disenfranchisement of 
Formerly Convicted and Incarcerated Persons, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 173, 183 (2004). 
 323.  Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 78–79 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Memorandum of the Secretary of State of California in Opposition to Certiorari, Cnty. Clerks & 
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Without social capital, the cycle of deprivation continues with ex-
offenders being the hardest hit. 
Although legislators and ex-offenders have much in common by way 
of reforming penal policy, albeit for different reasons, it is unlikely that a 
true coalition will be built.  Legislators hoping for increased revenue 
through a productive, employed citizenry and ex-offenders needing 
occupational opportunity, will doubtful unite to reform current 
occupational licensing schemas.  The reason for this skepticism stems 
from the fact that legislators are preoccupied with election risks, and 
being associated as a champion of ex-offender employment could make 
constituents uneasy about their legislators’ stance on crime.324  Despite 
state and federal studies on incarceration costs and recidivism, 
retrenchment from escalating criminal penalties is unlikely to take place 
in a legislative forum until courts begin to assess the constitutionality of 
employment consequences of conviction and signal a need for change. 
B. Eighth Amendment 
Another counterargument is that the Eighth Amendment is better 
suited to address the issue of occupational consequences because 
criminal conduct underlies the government deprivation.  This argument, 
while important and potentially true, is flawed.  First, collateral 
consequences of conviction are civil penalties and are unlikely to be 
deemed an extension of criminal punishment.  This calls for a different 
mode of analysis the Eighth Amendment cannot provide.  Moreover, the 
Court’s tortured history with proportionality and prison sentences has 
thus far resulted in a line of precedent that offers almost no protections 
against excessive prison sentences but offers significant protection 
against excessive punitive damage awards.325  The Court has been 
hesitant in the application of proportionality in evaluating sentences and 
has often regressed from any asserted principles defending an individual 
prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right against excessive penalty.326  Under 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, collateral consequences are likely to 
have a mixed outcome at best. 
                                                                                                                       
 
Registrars of Voters v. Ramirez, No. 73-324) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 324.  See Catherine Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of Criminal Laws that 
Have Swept the Country, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 35–36 (2010); Gershowitz, supra note 115. 
 325.  Chemerinsky, supra note 202, at 1051. 
 326.  See supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
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C. Sixth Amendment 
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,327 
reentry scholars are arguing to extend the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel to other types of collateral consequences of conviction.328  This 
position appears to be a logical extension of Padilla; however, it may not 
be that simple.  There are numerous hurdles to overcome. 
The principal issue is the collateral consequences rule and its history 
in conjunction with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  The 
collateral consequences rule states: 
For purposes of determining whether a trial court has complied with its 
duty under the Due Process Clause to ensure that a guilty plea is 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the Supreme Court has 
distinguished between direct consequences, which must be explained to 
the defendant, and collateral consequences, which the plea court has no 
duty to explore.329 
Direct consequences include the maximum term of imprisonment and 
fines for the crime charged.330  Collateral consequences, on the other 
hand, include parole and probation issues, civil commitment and 
forfeiture, habitual offender statutes, registration requirements, 
disenfranchisement, ineligibility to serve on a jury, and loss of 
professional licenses.331  All federal circuit courts of appeal except the 
Eighth and the Federal Circuit accept the rule, as do thirty-five state 
jurisdictions.332  While the Padilla Court found deportation to be directly 
connected to a criminal conviction,333 it is unlikely that occupational 
licenses will be given the same treatment.  The issue of deportation has 
invited a range of opinions on how removal as the result of criminal 
                                                          
 327.  130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486–87 (2010) (holding that a criminal defense attorney’s failure to 
advise his noncitizen client regarding the deportation consequences of a plea of guilty that would 
result in criminal conviction violated the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of 
counsel). 
 328.  Margaret Love & Gabriel Chin, The “Major Upheaval” of Padilla v. Kentucky: Extending 
the Right to Counsel to the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 25 CRIM. JUST. 36, 41–42 (2010). 
 329.  Chin & Holmes, supra note 271, at 704. 
 330.  Id. (citing United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1130 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
 331.  Id. at 705–06. 
 332.  Id. at 706–08.  The state jurisdictions include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.  Id. 
 333.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486–87 (2010). 
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conviction should be treated even in those jurisdictions that have adopted 
the collateral consequences rule.334 
The sheer number of civil penalties in each jurisdiction may also 
dissuade courts from imposing an affirmative duty on defense counsel to 
warn their clients of all collateral consequences.  While the ABA 
recommends that defense counsel warn their clients of these civil 
penalties,335 the Supreme Court has asserted that these ABA 
recommendations are only guides and are not binding on the courts.336 
It is important to mention that the Padilla Court dissenters, Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, may have joined the majority had Padilla grounded 
his constitutional claim in due process.337  For Justice Scalia, the text of 
the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel in all criminal 
prosecutions and not in all matters collateral to criminal prosecutions.338  
For constitutional textualists, this line of reasoning makes perfect sense. 
The argument made by reentry scholars that the Sixth Amendment is 
the proper vehicle to challenge collateral consequences is both salient 
and legally sound, but it is only one tool in the reentry toolbox.  This 
article advocates for yet another claim for individuals challenging the 
constitutionality of civil penalties, occupational licenses in particular, 
triggered by a criminal conviction. 
VII.CONCLUSION 
While the fate of ex-offenders is not at the top of the legislative 
priority list of state governments or Congress, expenditures on 
corrections is gaining public attention.  We as a country can no longer 
afford to pay for the imprisonment of nonviolent offenders.  One method 
to reduce the price tag is to prevent recidivism through occupational 
opportunity.  With the ever expansive, overinclusive web of collateral 
consequences triggered by conviction, such opportunity is dangerously 
low, forcing states to continue to pay the price for individual recidivism.  
Understanding that support for repealing professional licensing 
restrictions for felons is a bullet in any legislators’ political future, the 
                                                          
 334.  Chin & Holmes, supra note 271, at 708. 
 335.  ABA STANDARD FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19-2.3 (3d ed. 2004), available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/Publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_collateral_blk.ht
ml#2.3.  
 336.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
 337.  See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating the Due Process Clauses are 
more appropriate than the Sixth Amendment for Padilla’s complaint). 
 338.  Id. at 1494. 
SILVA FINAL COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/2012  1:08 PM 
2012] IN SEARCH OF A SECOND CHANCE 545 
courts may have to step in to push state legislators in the direction of 
repealing, or at the very least modifying, these disqualifications so that 
ex-offenders may support themselves, their families, and stay out of state 
and federal jails and prisons. 
Although jurisprudence in the area of collateral consequences is 
sparse and at times contradictory, the Supreme Court has developed a 
framework that will lend itself to a fair evaluation of occupational 
licensing restrictions in the new millennium.  This BMW framework, 
although heavily criticized, is a starting point in the analysis of the civil 
penalties associated with criminal convictions.  Hopefully, the argument 
advanced in this Article offers a different paradigm in which to frame the 
current discourse surrounding collateral consequences of conviction 
generally and occupational licenses specifically.  What this Article does 
is utilize a heavily criticized Supreme Court opinion in a way that could 
help millions of American citizens.  It also encourages the application of 
the neutral-principles epistemology in today’s Court judgments.  
Scholars and advocates may look for next steps and additional challenges 
to occupational licensing restrictions rooted in constitutional law.  
Moving forward, it is important to consider that this demographic lacks 
access to many of the resources and institutional understanding that 
facilitates reforms necessary to ensure due process is respected and 
administered even-handedly. 
This Article, if nothing else, hopefully adds to the reentry 
conversation by situating the problem in context and looking for a real 
solution with promise of success.  Scholars’ approach to constitutional 
challenges must be pragmatic and address practical realities.  By 
advancing this framework, scholars will call for the Court to apply its 
doctrine evenhandedly to both real people and multibillion-dollar 
corporations.  It is a stepping stone on a platform of reform necessary to 
reintegrate the most left behind in American society and save taxpayer 
dollars in a stale economy.  The fight for second chances is proving to be 
a game of inches. 
